

2 June 67

S E C R E T

BRIEFING NOTES

CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA

BACKGROUND

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I. [REDACTED] WE BELIEVE THAT THE ESSENCE OF THE CASTRO REGIME'S POLICY ON BEHALF OF ARMED REBELLION IN THE HEMISPHERE WAS ESTABLISHED IN THE EARLY MONTHS OF THE REGIME'S EXISTENCE AND HAS NOT CHANGED SINCE THEN.

A. THE RECORD CLEARLY SHOWS THAT "EXPORT OF THE REVOLUTION" HAS BEEN CASTRO'S PARAMOUNT AMBITION, NEXT TO MAINTAINING HIS OWN FIRM GRIP ON POWER. INDEED, WE BELIEVE THE CUBAN LEADER IS A "COMPULSIVE REVOLUTIONARY;" A MAN WHO SEEKS HIMSELF AS ANOTHER SIMON BOLIVAR, DESTINED TO BRING A NEW "FREEDOM AND UNITY" TO LATIN AMERICA.

B. CASTRO HAS BEEN CONSISTENT IN THIS DREAM, ALTHOUGH HE HAS PURSUED IT WITH VARYING DEGREES OF INTENSITY SINCE 1959. THE EVIDENCE IS OVERWHELMING, YOUR EXCELLENCY, THAT WE ARE NOW IN ANOTHER PERIOD

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OF INCREASED EFFORT TO ESTABLISH "OTHER CUBAS"
IN LATIN AMERICA.

C. BEFORE DISCUSSING THE PRESENT SITUATION, HOWEVER,
I WOULD LIKE TO REVIEW WITH YOU SOME OF THE HIGH-
LIGHTS OF CASTRO'S PAST RECORD OF SPONSORING EF-
FORTS TO OVERTHROW LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENTS
THROUGHOUT THE HEMISPHERE.

II. CASTRO WAGED HIS REVOLUTION DURING 1957 AND 1958 AS AN
INDIGENOUS CUBAN MOVEMENT. ONCE HE ASSUMED POWER,
HOWEVER, IT BECAME EVIDENT THAT HE HAD SET FOR HIMSELF
THE GOAL OF "LIBERATING LATIN AMERICA FROM US DOMINATION."

A. THE EARLIEST PUBLIC MANIFESTATIONS OF THIS REVO-
LUTIONARY MISSION WERE THE ARMED EXPEDITIONS WHICH
SET FORTH FROM CUBA TO SUCH CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES AS
PANAMA, HAITI, NICARAGUA, AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
DURING THE FIRST 8 OR 9 MONTHS CASTRO WAS IN POWER.

B. IN PRIVATE STATEMENTS DURING THIS PERIOD, CASTRO
MADE IT KNOWN THAT HE LOOKED UPON HIS SUCCESS IN
CUBA AS MERELY THE FIRST STAGE IN A CONTINENT-WIDE
EFFORT. [REDACTED]

CASTRO CAME TO CARACAS

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IN JANUARY 1959 --- SCARCELY 3 WEEKS AFTER ASSUMING POWER --- TO ENLIST VENEZUELAN COOPERATION AND FINANCIAL BACKING FOR "THE MASTER PLAN AGAINST THE GRINGOS."

- C. CASTRO SOUNDED THE KEYNOTE FOR CUBAN SUBVERSION ON 26 JULY 1960, WHEN HE SAID, "WE PROMISE TO CONTINUE MAKING CUBA THE EXAMPLE THAT CAN CONVERT THE CORDILLERA OF THE ANDES INTO THE SIERRA MAESTRA OF THE AMERICAN CONTINENT."
- D. IN SEPTEMBER 1960, CASTRO ISSUED HIS RINGING "FIRST DECLARATION OF HAVANA," WHICH UNMISTAKABLY SHOWED THAT HE LOOKED UPON THE CUBAN REVOLUTION AS THE VANGUARD OF A GENERAL LATIN AMERICAN POLITICAL UPHEAVAL.
- III. THE CUBAN EFFORT HAS GRADUALLY ASSUMED A DEGREE OF SOPHISTICATION FAR REMOVED FROM THE FIRST HASTILY ORGANIZED AND ILL-CONCEIVED RAIDS. CUBAN SUPPORT HAS TAKEN MANY FORMS, RANGING FROM INSPIRATION AND TRAINING TO SUCH TANGIBLES AS FINANCING AND COMMUNICATIONS ASSISTANCE.

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IV. CUBAN EFFORTS TO PROMOTE SUBVERSION OVER THE LAST 8 YEARS OR SO HAVE FOLLOWED AN INTERESTING RISE AND FLOW PATTERN.

- A. THE YEARS BETWEEN 1960 AND 1962 MARKED A PERIOD OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUBVERSIVE CAPABILITIES IN WHICH THE CUBANS ESTABLISHED MECHANISMS AT HOME AND ABROAD FOR CONDUCTING SUBVERSIVE OPERATIONS. RADIO HAVANA'S INTERNATIONAL SERVICE WAS INAUGURATED ON MAY DAY 1961, AND HAS BEAMED AN INCREASING STREAM OF REVOLUTIONARY PROPAGANDA TO THE AMERICAS EVER SINCE. FOR EXAMPLE, TODAY RADIO HAVANA BEAMS 175 HOURS A WEEK IN PORTUGUESE, SPANISH, FRENCH AND EVEN CREOLE, QUICHEUA AND GUARANI.
- B. DURING THIS PERIOD, THE CUBAN AGENCY FOR FOREIGN ESPIONAGE AND SUBVERSION, THE GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE (DGI), WAS ESTABLISHED WITHIN THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR. I WILL DISCUSS THE DGI AT SOME LENGTH IN A FEW MINUTES, BUT SUFFICE IT TO SAY FOR THE MOMENT THAT IT HAS BENEFITED FROM THE

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ADVICE OF AT LEAST 6 SOVIET INTELLIGENCE EXPERTS FROM THE VERY BEGINNING. THIS ORGANIZATION SENT OVER ONE MILLION DOLLARS (US) TO THE VENEZUELAN INSURGENTS ALONE BETWEEN 1961 AND 1964, AND OVER US\$200,000 TO MARCO ANTONIO YOM SOSA IN GUATEMALA IN 1963.

- C. FROM LATE 1961 THROUGH 1963, THE CUBAN REGIME STEPPED UP THE TEMPO OF ITS FOREIGN OPERATIONS.
- D. THE MOST SPECTACULAR EVENT DURING THIS PERIOD WAS THE DISCOVERY OF A CACHE OF 3 TONS OF WEAPONS ON A VENEZUELAN BEACH IN NOVEMBER 1963. THE WEAPONS INCLUDED LIGHT AUTOMATIC RIFLES AND SUBMACHINEGUNS DEFINITELY IDENTIFIED AS AMONG THOSE SHIPPED TO CUBA FROM BELGIUM IN 1959 AND 1960. THERE WERE ALSO MORTARS, BAZOOKAS, RECOILLESS RIFLES, AND AMMUNITION OF US MANUFACTURE. THE MOTOR OF A SMALL BOAT FOUND NEAR THE CACHE SITE WAS TRACED AND FOUND TO BE ONE OF SEVERAL WHICH EARLIER HAD BEEN SENT TO CUBA FROM CANADA.
- E. COMMUNIST DOCUMENTS SEIZED BY THE VENEZUELAN AUTHORITIES SHORTLY AFTER THE DISCOVERY OF THE CACHE

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DEMONSTRATED THAT THE EQUIPMENT WAS INTENDED FOR THE PARAMILITARY ARM OF THE VENEZUELAN COMMUNIST PARTY FOR PLAN CARACAS -- AIMED AT DISRUPTING THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN DECEMBER OF THAT YEAR.

F. DURING THIS PERIOD, CUBAN-TRAINED GUERRILLAS TRIED TO INITIATE OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN PERU AND ARGENTINA. SHORTLY AFTERWARDS, CUBAN AGENTS IN LA PAZ TRIED TO STIMULATE BOLIVIAN GROUPS TO TAKE UP ARMED ACTION AGAINST THE PAZ ESTENECERO GOVERNMENT.

25X6 G. [REDACTED]

25X6

[REDACTED] BRAZIL WAS ONE OF CASTRO'S TARGET COUNTRIES DURING THIS 1961-1963 PERIOD. CUBAN FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE WAS SENT TO BRAZILIAN SUBVERSIVE ELEMENTS SEEKING TO ESTABLISH GUERRILLA TRAINING CAMPS IN THE STATE OF GOIAS, AS WELL AS TO PEASANT-LEADER FRANCISCO JULIAO AND THEN-GOVERNOR LEONEL BRIZOLA. AFTER CUBAN FOREIGN MINISTER ROA'S SON, RAUL ROA KOURI, WAS APPOINTED AMBASSADOR TO BRAZIL IN APRIL 1963, HE SERVED AS A CHANNEL FOR CUBAN FUNDS AND GUIDANCE TO BRAZILIAN

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SUBVERSIVES. AT ONE POINT ROA DESCRIBED BRIZOLA AS "THE BRAZILIAN WITH THE GREATEST REVOLUTIONARY POTENTIAL." [REDACTED]

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2 CUBAN COURIERS WERE ON THEIR WAY TO BRAZIL WITH CLANDESTINE FUNDS EARMARKED FOR BRIZOLA AND HIS ASSOCIATES WHEN PRESIDENT GOULART WAS OVERTHROWN.

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H. IN SHORT, [REDACTED] DURING THIS PEAK PERIOD OF CUBAN SUBVERSIVE EFFORTS, CASTRO ENCOURAGED IN AN ALMOST HAPHAZARD FASHION A WIDE VARIETY OF EXTREMIST GROUPS IN MANY COUNTRIES TO BEGIN THE ARMED STRUGGLE. WE ESTIMATE THAT AT LEAST 1,000 TO 2,000 LATIN AMERICANS RECEIVED EITHER GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING OR POLITICAL IndoctrINATION IN CUBA BETWEEN 1961 AND 1964.

V. CASTRO'S INDISCRIMINATE SUBVERSIVE EFFORTS BROUGHT HIM INTO DISAGREEMENT WITH SOVIET LEADERS AND INTO CONFLICT WITH LEADERS OF MOST OF THE PRINCIPAL ORTHODOX COMMUNIST PARTIES IN LATIN AMERICA. IN NOVEMBER 1964, THE SOVIETS HELPED TO WORK OUT A COMPROMISE WHICH CALLED FOR SUPPORT TO INSURGENCY EFFORTS IN A FEW LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, BUT SPECIFIED THAT IN ALL CASES THE LOCAL COMMUNIST PARTY SHOULD DETERMINE WHETHER VIOLENT OR NON-VIOLENT MEANS WERE TO BE PURSUED.

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- A. FOR ABOUT A YEAR, CASTRO MUTED HIS REVOLUTIONARY EXHORTATIONS AND NARROWED HIS FOCUS TO THREE COUNTRIES -- VENEZUELA, GUATEMALA, AND COLOMBIA -- WHERE DOINA PIDE GUERRILLA BANDS WERE IN THE FIELD AND ACTIVELY ENGAGING GOVERNMENT SECURITY FORCES.
- B. THIS CHANGE IN FORM PROBABLY WAS PARTIALLY A RESULT OF THE NOVEMBER 1964 MEETING, AS WELL AS OF THE DECISIVE SETBACKS THE CUBANS HAD RECEIVED IN VENEZUELA IN LATE 1963; IN PANAMA IN JANUARY 1964; AND, AGAIN, IF I MAY BE SO CANDID, IN BRAZIL WHEN PRESIDENT OCULART WAS REPLACED.
- C. THE CUBANS SOON BEGAN CHIPPING AT THE EDGES OF THEIR PLEDGE OF NOVEMBER 1964. AT THE TRI-CONTINENTAL CONFERENCE IN JANUARY 1966, CASTRO ISSUED A MORE GENERAL CALL FOR INSURGENCY IN LATIN AMERICA. SINCE THEN, CUBAN PROPAGANDA HAS RETURNED TO THE STRIDENT PITCH WE NOTED IN 1963. THE OPERATIONAL DIFFERENCE NOW, IN COMPARISON WITH THE EARLIER YEARS, IS THAT THE CUBANS ARE CONTINUING TO FOCUS ON A SELECTED LIST OF TARGET COUNTRIES -- VENEZUELA, GUATEMALA, BOLIVIA, AND COLOMBIA. ELSEWHERE, THEY

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ARE SEEKING OPPORTUNITIES WHICH LEND THEMSELVES
TO FOREIGN EXPLOITATION.

VI. AS IS EVIDENT, [REDACTED] CASTRO'S BEHAVIOR IN ADVOCATING AND ASSISTING REVOLUTION HAS NOT ALWAYS BEEN LOGICAL AND REALISTIC. HE HAS BEEN CANNY ENOUGH, HOWEVER, TO KEEP HIS RISKS LOW. THE FORM AND EXTENT OF HIS EFFORTS, VOCAL AND MATERIAL, HAVE VARIED WITH CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES BUT HIS ESSENTIAL THEME CONTINUES.

- A. HE INSISTS THAT REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE IS NECESSARY TO BRING ABOUT ANY MEANINGFUL CHANGE.
- B. HE CLAIMS THAT GUERRILLA UNITS, WHEN BOLDLY LED, CAN TAKE TO THE FIELD AND SUSTAIN THEMSELVES THERE, AND PRECIPITATE THE CONDITIONS WHICH WILL ASSURE THEIR EVENTUAL SUCCESS.

(I NOW WANT TO DISCUSS IN SOME DETAIL MORE RECENT HARD EVIDENCE OF CUBAN SUBVERSIVE EFFORTS IN THE KEY TARGET COUNTRIES, THE ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTION OF CUBA'S FOREIGN SUBVERSION AGENCY THE DGI, AND THE COMING LATIN AMERICAN SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATIONS MEETING IN HAVANA.)

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THE CURRENT SITUATION

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VII. [REDACTED] THE RECENT CASTRO-SUPPORTED GUERRILLA

OUTBREAKS IN BOLIVIA AND CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE INSURGENT LANDING IN VENEZUELA ON MAY 8TH ARE THE NEWEST INDICATIONS OF FIDEL CASTRO'S LONGSTANDING DETERMINATION TO SPREAD REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE IN LATIN AMERICA. TANGIBLE CUBAN SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY IN LATIN AMERICA HAS BEEN AT A SOMEWHAT LOWER LEVEL OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS THAN DURING THE PEAK PERIOD, WHICH I HAVE JUST DESCRIBED, FROM 1961 TO 1963. THIS DOES NOT, HOWEVER, REFLECT ANY WEAKENING OF CASTRO'S DETERMINATION TO SPREAD HIS REVOLUTION. [REDACTED] FOR ON MAY 15TH HE ONCE AGAIN PROCLAIMED HIS DETERMINATION TO "FULFILL HIS DUTY OF SOLIDARITY" WITH REVOLUTIONARIES AROUND THE WORLD.

A. DESPITE HIS NOVEMBER 1964 DECLARATION THAT HE WOULD NOT SUPPORT WOULD-BE INSURGENT GROUPS WHICH WERE NOT UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE ORTHODOX PRO-MOSCOW COMMUNISTS, CASTRO HAS CONTINUED TO GIVE MORAL, MATERIAL, AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT AND TRAINING

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TO SUCH GROUPS IN VENEZUELA, COLOMBIA, GUATEMALA,
AND MOST RECENTLY BOLIVIA --- HIS FOUR PRIORITY
TARGETS AT PRESENT. FURTHERMORE, HE HAS MADE IT
CLEAR IN RECENT SPEECHES THAT HE DOES NOT FEEL
BOUND BY THE 1964 AGREEMENT.

- B. ON MARCH 13TH, HE REPEATED HIS PERSISTENT THESIS
THAT VIOLENT REVOLUTION IS NECESSARY TO BRING
ABOUT ANY MEANINGFUL POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE
IN LATIN AMERICA. THE SAME THEME WAS EMPHASIZED
IN THE TRADITIONAL MAY DAY SPEECH BY ACTING MIN-
ISTER OF ARMED FORCES JUAN ALMEIDA.
1. CASTRO FLUNG ACCUSATIONS OF COWARDICE AND
BETRAYAL AT ORTHODOX COMMUNIST PARTIES WHICH
DO NOT GIVE FULL SUPPORT TO DISSIDENT INSUR-
GENT GROUPS --- IN VENEZUELA AND COLOMBIA,
FOR EXAMPLE.
2. HE APPEARED PARTICULARLY IRKED THAT A SOVIET
DELEGATION HAD BEEN TRYING TO IMPROVE RELA-
TIONS AND EXPAND TRADE IN SOME OF THE COUNTRIES ---
COLOMBIA AND VENEZUELA IN PARTICULAR --- WHERE

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HE HOPES TO DEVELOP REVOLUTIONS. HE COMPLAINED THAT MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNIST CAMP -- OBVIOUSLY THE SOVIET UNION -- WHO DEAL WITH OLIGARCHIES IN COUNTRIES WHERE INSURGENTS ARE ACTIVE ARE BETRAYING THE REVOLUTIONARIES.

C. CASTRO'S STATEMENTS CONTINUE TO REFLECT HIS INTENSE DISILLUSIONMENT WITH THE URBAN-BASED PRO-MOSCOW COMMUNIST PARTIES. THE SAME THOUGHT HAS BEEN PROPOUNDED BY HIS THEORETICAL ADVISER JULES REGIS DEBRAY, WHO WAS RECENTLY IN BOLIVIA. DEBRAY'S THESIS, WHICH MERELY REFLECTS CASTRO'S OWN THINKING, IS THAT LATIN AMERICA NEEDS A DYNAMIC, OFFENSIVE, RURAL-ORIENTED GUERRILLA ACTION IN WHICH THE BASIC GUERRILLA GROUP TAKES PREDENCE OVER THE URBAN-BASED PARTY AND, IN FACT, BECOMES THE "AUTENTIC" PARTY.

1. THE RECENT PUBLICATION OF THESE IDEAS IN MANY LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES -- INCLUDING YOUR OWN -- (EXCERPTS APPEARED IN THE MAY 28TH JORNAL DO BRASIL WILL ENCOURAGE THE RURAL

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GUERRILLA MOVEMENTS TO EVEN GREATER INDEPENDENCE OF THE REGULAR PARTIES.

2. IN HIS MARCH 13TH SPEECH, CASTRO STATED: "IF, IN ANY NATION, THOSE WHO CALL THEMSELVES COMMUNISTS DO NOT KNOW HOW TO FULFILL THEIR DUTY, WE WILL SUPPORT THOSE WHO --- EVEN THOUGH THEY DO NOT CALL THEMSELVES COMMUNISTS --- BEHAVE LIKE REAL COMMUNISTS IN THE STRUGGLE."

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3. THIS IS A CRYSTAL-CLEAR REJECTION OF THE NOVEMBER 1964 AGREEMENT, [REDACTED] CASTRO IS SAYING THAT WHILEVER THE ORTHODOX COMMUNIST PARTIES REFUSE TO SEEK THE VIOLENT ROAD OF REVOLUTION TO SEIZE POWER, HE WILL IGNORE THE PARTY LEADERS AND WORK WITH MILITANT EXTREMISTS WHO ARE READY TO FIGHT.

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VIII. [REDACTED] EVEN IN THOSE LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES WHERE THERE IS NO SIGNIFICANT INSURGENCY UNDER WAY, THE CUBANS HAVE BEEN DEVELOPING A SUPPORT MECHANISM WHILE THEY WAIT FOR A SUITABLE OPPORTUNITY AND ADEQUATE ASSETS. MOREOVER, RECENT EVIDENCE INDICATES THAT CASTRO HAS CREATED A SPECIAL SO-MAN INTELLIGENCE AND COMMANDO UNIT --- AN ARM OF THE GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE --- TO

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PROMOTE AND SUPPORT ARMED CLANDESTINE PENETRATIONS IN
VARIOUS LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES.

A. THE CREATOR OF THIS SUPPORT MECHANISM AND, IN
FACT, THE APPARATUS RESPONSIBLE FOR MANAGING ALL
OF CUBA'S ESPIONAGE AND SUBVERSION ACTIVITIES IS
THE GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE (DGI).

1. THE DGI WAS FORMED IN 1961 FOLLOWING A GEN-
ERAL REORGANIZATION OF CUBA'S INTERNAL SECURITY
AND FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES. ITS
DIRECTOR GENERAL IS MANUEL PINERO, WHO HAS
BEEN CLOSE TO RAUL CASTRO SINCE 1957 AND WHO
HAS BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH CUBAN FOREIGN INTEL-
LIGENCE SINCE 1959. UNDER HIS LEADERSHIP AND
THE TUTELAGE OF SEVERAL SOVIET INTELLIGENCE
ADVISERS, THE DGI HAS BEEN MOLDED INTO A HIGHLY
PROFESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION ALONG
CLASSICAL SOVIET LINES.

(DGI GRAPHIC)

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[REDACTED]

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- B. IN ADDITION TO THE CONSTRUCTION OF THIS SUPPORT MECHANISM AND THE GROWTH AND IMPROVEMENT OF ITS CLANDESTINE SERVICE, CUBA HAS BEEN ABLE TO BRING ABOUT INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION OF NATIONAL MOVEMENTS AND PARTIES IN SOME AREAS. THIS HAS HELPED TO CREATE OR STRENGTHEN INFRASTRUCTURES UPON WHICH FUTURE REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES CAN BE BUILT, BY MAKING IT EASIER TO CHANNEL FUNDS, MOVE AGENTS AND LEADERS, TRANSMIT COMMUNICATIONS, AND OBTAIN FALSE DOCUMENTS.
1. TWO GROUPS PROVIDING SUCH SUPPORT TO THE VENEZUELAN MOVEMENTS WERE UNCOVERED IN COLOMBIA IN 1966, AND ONE OF THE COLOMBIAN MOVEMENTS HAS CHOSEN THE VENEZUELAN BORDER REGION AS ITS AREA OF GUERRILLA OPERATIONS. THUS IT CAN SUPPORT VENEZUELANS MOVING EITHER WAY ACROSS THE BORDER, AND ITS MEMBERS ARE IN POSITION TO CROSS INTO VENEZUELA THEMSELVES.
2. THE SALVADORAN PARTY HAS PROVIDED SALVADORAN DOCUMENTATION TO GUATEMALANS FOR TRAVEL TO BLOC COUNTRIES, AND HAS ALSO PROVIDED SANCTUARY FOR GUATEMALANS AND HONDURANS.

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IX. I AM SURE YOU ARE AWARE, [REDACTED] THAT THE LATIN AMERICAN SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATION (LASO), AN OUTGROWTH OF THE TRI-CONTINENT CONFERENCE, IS TO HOLD ITS FIRST MEETING IN HAVANA IN LATE JULY. THE CONFERENCE'S SLOGAN -- "THE DUTY OF EVERY REVOLUTIONARY IS TO MAKE REVOLUTION," IS A GOOD INDICATION THAT ITS ORGANIZERS, PARTICULARLY THE CUBANS, INTEND TO GUIDE IT ALONG THE MILITANT LINES OF LAST YEAR'S TRI-CONTINENT CONFERENCE.

A. THE QUESTION OF WHO IS TO BE INVITED TO THE JULY CONFERENCE AND WHO THE LASO MEMBERS WILL BE APPEARS TO BE CAUSING DIFFICULTY. THUS FAR, ONLY THE CHILEAN, COLOMBIAN, AND CUBAN NATIONAL LASO COMMITTEES HAVE BEEN SET UP. IN OTHER COUNTRIES, DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE LOCAL PRO-SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTIES AND PRO-CASTRO EXTREME LEFT-WING GROUPS HAVE DELAYED PROGRESS.

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B. MOREOVER, [REDACTED] GIVEN CASTRO'S ALREADY STATED DISSATISFACTION WITH THE POLICIES OF THE PRO-SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTIES IN LATIN AMERICA, AND

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HIS UNWILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT THEM AS LEADERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT, THE CUBANS ARE UNLIKELY TO CONCERN THEM THE DECIDING VOICE IN DETERMINING THE COMPOSITION OF LASO.

C. WHATEVER THE OUTCOME OF THE DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE PRO-SOVIET COMMUNISTS AND PRO-CASTRO EXTREMISTS, IT IS VERY LIKELY THAT DELIGATIONS TO THE CONFERENCE WILL CONTAIN FEW PRO-SOVIET COMMUNISTS. THESE CANNOT BE LOOKING FORWARD TO THE GATHERING WITH MUCH PLEASURE; THE MILITANT AGENDA AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF CUBAN CONTROL OVER THE PROCEEDINGS MEAN THAT ITS OUTCOME WILL HARDLY BE IN LINE WITH THEIR OWN POLICIES. THE SLOGAN ITSELF MAY BE OFFENSIVE TO THEM. CASTRO HAS FREQUENTLY IMPLIED THAT MAKING REVOLUTION IS PRECISELY WHAT ORTHODOX COMMUNISTS ARE FAILING TO DO. THE CONFERENCE COULD, THEREFORE, BECOME THE SCENE OF OPEN CLASHES BETWEEN THE PRO-SOVIET COMMUNISTS AND THE CUBANS AND THEIR FIDELISTA SUPPORTERS, OR, IF THE PRO-MOSCOW COMMUNISTS ARE EXCLUDED ENTIRELY, THE CONFERENCE MAY REPRESENT ONLY SMALL GROUPS OF EXTREMISTS.

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D. IN EITHER CASE, IT WILL GIVE THE CUBANS AN EXCELLENT CHANCE TO OFFER MORE TRAINING, PROPAGANDA GUIDELINES, AND POSSIBLY FUNDS TO THE LEADERS OF VARIOUS GROUPS OF THE EXTREME LEFT WHO WILL BE ATTENDING.

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X. FOR THE PAST YEAR, [REDACTED] HAVANA'S EMPHASIS HAS BEEN ON LAYING A SOLID FOUNDATION FOR FUTURE REVOLUTIONARY ACTION, ATTEMPTING TO UNITE THE FEUDING Factions OF THE EXTREME LEFT UNDER ONE LEADERSHIP, AND EXCITING THOSE REVOLUTIONARIES WHO ARE WILLING TO TAKE UP THE FIGHT, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THEY ARE BONA FIDE COMMUNISTS.

A. HAVANA IS NOW BROADCASTING ABOUT 175 HOURS A WEEK TO LATIN AMERICA, PRIMARILY IN SPANISH AND PORTUGUESE. THERE IS ALSO, HOWEVER, PROPAGANDA IN FRENCH AND CREOLE FOR HAITI, GUARANI FOR PARAGUAY, AND QUECHUA FOR BOLIVIA. THE QUECHUA SCHEDULE FOR BOLIVIA WAS INCREASED FROM 1 1/2 HOURS PER WEEK TO 7 ON MARCH 31ST -- JUST ONE WEEK AFTER THE FIRST GUERRILLA CLASH IN THAT COUNTRY.

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- B. THE EXTENT OF GUERRILLA ACTIVITY IN LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES IS DIRECTLY RELATED, OF COURSE, TO HOW DISSATISFIED THE PEOPLE OF A GIVEN COUNTRY MAY BE OVER SOCIAL INJUSTICES AND THE LACK OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, AND WHAT CHANCE THERE APPEARS TO BE FOR REFORM.
1. CUBAN PROPAGANDA TAKES THE LINE THAT THE RULING OLIGARCHIES HAVE FRUSTRATED AND WILL CONTINUE TO DEFEAT ALL ATTEMPTS TO CHANGE EXISTING CONDITIONS BY LEGAL AND PARLIAMENTARY METHODS.
2. THEREFORE, HAVANA RADIO ARGUES, THE SO-CALLED "VIA PACIFICA" OR PEACEFUL PATH OF REFORM SOUGHT BY MANY OF THE ORTHODOX COMMUNIST PARTIES IS INEFFECTIVE, AND THE ONLY COURSE IS ARMED STRUGGLE.

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- II. I PROPOSE AT THIS POINT, [REDACTED] TO EXAMINE CUBAN GOALS AND ACTIVITIES IN THE INDIVIDUAL LATIN AMERICAN TARGET COUNTRIES — VENEZUELA, COLOMBIA, GUATEMALA, AND BOLIVIA.

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VENZUELA (MAP)

XII. CUBA ACTIVELY SUPPORTS COMMUNIST INSURGENCY IN VENEZUELA, WHICH HEADS CASTRO'S LIST OF LATIN AMERICAN TARGETS.

A. THE LATEST INCIDENT TOOK PLACE ON MAY 8TH WHEN VENEZUELAN GUERRILLAS, ESCORTED BY CUBAN MILITARY PERSONNEL, LANDED NEAR THE COASTAL VILLAGE OF MACHURUCUTO.

1. ONE OF THE CUBANS DROWNED WHEN A RUBBER RAFT CAPSIZED. ANOTHER WAS SHOT RESISTING ARREST.

2. TWO OTHER CUBANS WERE SEIZED BY VENEZUELAN SECURITY FORCES. ONE HAS SINCE COMMITTED SUICIDE IN HIS PRISON CELL.

3. ALSO TAKEN WERE IN INFLATABLE 15-MAN BOAT, AMMUNITION, COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, SURVIVAL APPARATUS, AND ABOUT \$10,000 IN US MONEY.

B. THE VENEZUELAN GUERRILLAS WHO ESCAPED, AND THE EQUIPMENT, WERE DESTINED FOR A GUERRILLA GROUP KNOWN AS THE MOVEMENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT, OR M.I.R., WHICH HAS BEEN OPERATING IN THE

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BACHILLER MOUNTAINS, SOUTHEAST OF CARACAS. THE LEADER IS AMERICO MARTIN, WHO WAS TRAINED IN GUERRILLA WARFARE TECHNIQUES IN CUBA IN 1963, AND HAS MADE ADDITIONAL TRIPS TO HAVANA SINCE THAT TIME. MARTIN AND ONE OF HIS LIEUTENANTS WERE SUBSEQUENTLY CAPTURED ON 3 JUNE WHILE ATTEMPTING TO LEAVE VENEZUELA FOR EUROPE, PROBABLY EN ROUTE TO CUBA.

C. THE OTHER, AND LARGER, GUERRILLA GROUP THAT CASTRO SUPPORTS IN VENEZUELA IS CALLED THE F.A.L.N., OR ARMED FORCES OF NATIONAL LIBERATION. THIS GROUP BEGAN OPERATIONS MORE THAN FIVE YEARS AGO AS THE COMBINED PARAMILITARY ARM OF THE MILITANT COMMUNISTS AND THE M.I.R.

1. IN 1963, THE F.A.L.N. PULLED OFF SUCH DRAMATIC FEATS AS THE HIJACKING OF A VENEZUELAN FREIGHTER, THE ANZOATEGUI, AND BOMBING THE U.S. EMBASSY IN CARACAS. IT LAUNCHED MAJOR CAMPAIGNS OF URBAN TERRORISM, SABOTAGE, AND RURAL GUERRILLA RAIDS IN AN EFFORT TO FORESTALL

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THE VISIT TO WASHINGTON OF PRESIDENT BETANCURT,
AND LATER, THE VENEZUELAN NATIONAL ELECTIONS.

2. WHEN THE P.A.L.N. FAILED TO ACHIEVE THESE GOALS, AND ALSO FAILED TO ATTRACT ANY SUBSTANTIAL SYMPATHY IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, THE ORTHODOX COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP DECIDED THAT ITS ACHIEVEMENTS WERE NOT WORTH THE DAMAGE THEY WERE DOING TO THE PARTY'S POLITICAL IMAGE, AND TRIED TO TONE DOWN THE MILITANCY.

D. THE ORDERS OF THE POLITBURO, HOWEVER, WERE DEFIED PUBLICLY BY P.A.L.N. LEADER DOUGLAS BRAVO, WHO ANNOUNCED THAT HE WOULD CONTINUE GUERRILLA OPERATIONS. ACCORDING TO RELIABLE REPORTS, BRAVO RECEIVED REINFORCEMENTS AND SUPPLIES FROM CUBA IN JULY 1966. HE HAS AN OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE IN HAVANA.

1. CASTRO'S SUPPORT FOR THE BRAVO GROUP BROUGHT STRONG PROTESTS FROM THE MOSCOW-LINE COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA LATE LAST YEAR.
2. CASTRO IN TURN, IN HIS MARCH 13TH, 1967 SPEECH,

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ATTACKED THE PARTY FOR FAILING TO LAUNCH A GUERRILLA OFFENSIVE.

3. THIS HAS BROUGHT THE CARACAS PARTY LEADERS CLOSE TO AN OPEN BREAK WITH THE CUBAN PARTY.

E. THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT, REACTING TO THE TERRORIST MURDER OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S BROTHER ON MARCH 1ST, THE INCREASING GUERRILLA FORAYS IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, AND NOW CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE MAY 8TH LANDING, HAS CALLED FOR A MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE OAS.

1. VENEZUELA IS CONSIDERING UNILATERAL MOVES SUCH AS BLACKLISTS OF FIRMS TRADING WITH CUBA AND OTHER ECONOMIC AND DIPLOMATIC PRESSURES. VENEZUELAN LABOR HAS REFUSED TO UNLOAD SHIPS FROM JAPAN AND SPAIN FOR DEALING WITH CUBA. THEY WILL PROBABLY INCREASE THIS HARASSMENT TO SHIPS OF OTHER NATIONS WHO DEAL WITH CUBA.

2. CASTRO IS UNMOVED. ON MAY 18TH THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY VIRTUALLY ADMITTED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE LANDING

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AND SAID THAT IT HAD A "MORAL REVOLUTIONARY DUTY" TO CONTINUE AIDING VENEZUELAN GUERRILLAS.

COLOMBIA (MAP)

XIII. THERE HAS RECENTLY BEEN REVIEWED AND INTENSIFIED GUERRILLA ACTIVITY IN COLOMBIA, WHICH CASTRO HIGHLIGHTS ALONG WITH VENEZUELA AS BEING IN THE FOREFRONT OF THOSE COUNTRIES "STRUGGLING AGAINST IMPERIALISM."

A. THERE HAS BEEN BANDITRY IN COLOMBIA FOR 400 YEARS, SINCE THE DAYS OF THE CONQUISTADORES. TRADITIONALLY, IT HAS VARIED FROM OUTRIGHT OUTLAWRY TO POLITICAL WARFARE.

1. IN RECENT YEARS, COMMUNISTS HAVE TAKEN OVER THE LEADERSHIP OF SOME OF THE BANDIT GANGS THAT HAVE OPERATED FOR YEARS IN THE MOUNTAINS SOUTH OF BOGOTA. THEY HAVE ESTABLISHED INFLUENCE OVER OTHERS, AND CONVERTED SOME OF THE BANDIT CHIEFTAINS TO COMMUNISM.

2. THESE ARE REMOTE AREAS WHERE EVEN THE ARMY OPERATES ONLY WITH DIFFICULTY, AND THE PEASANT HAS LITTLE SENSE OF IDENTITY WITH ANY NATIONAL GOVERNMENT.

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3. IT MIGHT BE SAID THAT THERE ARE ONLY HALF A DOZEN OF THESE ENCLAVES, IN OUT-OF-THE-WAY REGIONS. BUT THE SAME STATEMENT COULD HAVE BEEN MADE WITH EQUAL VALIDITY ABOUT SOUTH VIETNAM IN 1959, WHEN THERE WERE ONLY HALF A DOZEN AREAS OF VIET CONG ACTIVITY.
 4. IT IS WORTH NOTING THAT WHERE INROADS HAVE BEEN MADE AGAINST THESE COMMUNIST ENCLAVES, IT HAS BEEN AS A RESULT OF CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMS, EITHER GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED OR PUBLIC, COMBINED WITH STRONG MILITARY ACTION. ONE OF THE MOST EFFECTIVE PROGRAMS HAS BEEN A SERIES OF RADIO BROADCASTS RUN BY THE CHURCHES, TO TEACH THE FARMERS EASY, DO-IT-YOURSELF METHODS TO IMPROVE CULTIVATION, SANITATION, AND THE LIKE. THIS, BACKED BY ROADS TO LET THE GOVERNMENT IN AND THE FARM PRODUCE OUT, CAN DO MUCH TO BLUNT COMMUNIST BOASTS.
- B. INSURGENT OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHERN MOUNTAINS, IN SO FAR AS THERE IS ANY CENTRAL DIRECTION, ARE GENERALLY RUN BY THE F.A.R.C., OR REVOLUTIONARY ARMED

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FORCES OF COLOMBIA, AN OUTGROWTH OF ALLIANCE OF BANDIT GANGS AND COMMUNISTS. IN THE AREA NORTH OF BOGOTA, A NEW ORGANIZATION STIMULATED BY CUBA, THE E.L.N., OR ARMY OF NATIONAL LIBERATION, HAS TAKEN THE FIELD.

1. THERE HAVE BEEN SIX MAJOR INCIDENTS IN LESS THAN THREE MONTHS, INCLUDING AN E.L.N. ATTACK ON A POLICE POST IN WHICH FIVE POLICEMEN WERE KILLED, AND AN F.A.R.C. ATTACK ON A TRAIN AND AN AMBUSH OF AN ARMY PATROL, IN WHICH FIFTEEN SOLDIERS WERE KILLED.
2. BOTH THE E.L.N. AND THE F.A.R.C. ARE STRONGLY SUPPORTED BY CUBAN PROPAGANDA, BUT THE FULL EXTENT OF ACTUAL CUBAN AID TO THEM IS NOT KNOWN.
3. WE DO KNOW THAT AN E.L.N. LEADER RETURNED TO COLOMBIA FROM CUBA IN EARLY 1966 WITH \$40,000, AND ANOTHER RETURNED IN SEPTEMBER 1966 WITH \$10,000 IN HIS POCKET. IN LATE 1964 ANOTHER E.L.N. LEADER HAD BROUGHT BACK \$25,000.

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C. RECENT REPORTS INDICATE THAT, AS IN VENEZUELA, THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF COLOMBIA, OR PCC, IS INCREASINGLY OPPOSED TO CASTRO'S SUPPORT FOR GUERRILLAS IT DOES NOT CONTROL.

1. PARTY LEADERS CORRECTLY REASON THAT THEY ARE THE ONES WHO SUFFER DURING GOVERNMENT REPRISALS FOR GUERRILLA ATTACKS. THE RECENT LARGE-SCALE ROUNDUP OF COMMUNIST PARTY LEADERS IN BOGOTA BEARS OUT THEIR FEARS.
2. THE COLOMBIAN PARTY IS SOMEWHAT MORE FLEXIBLE ON THIS ISSUE, HOWEVER, THAN THE VENEZUELAN PARTY. IT PAYS AT LEAST LIP SERVICE TO THE NEED FOR SUPPORTING THE E.L.N. AND F.A.R.C.

BOLIVIA (MAP)

XIV. CUBAN EMBASSY OFFICERS IN BOLIVIA WERE EXTREMELY ACTIVE IN THE EARLY 1960'S, SUPPORTING VARIOUS LEFTIST-EXTREMIST GROUPS WITH TOKEN AMOUNTS OF MONEY AND ARMS. NEARLY 100 BOLIVIANS RECEIVED GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING IN CUBA. WHEN BOLIVIA BROKE RELATIONS WITH CUBA IN AUGUST 1964, HOWEVER, HAVANA LOST ITS EMBASSY CONTACT

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WITH BOLIVIAN SUBVERSIVES, AND CUBAN ACTIVITY SEEMED TO HAVE DIMINISHED.

- A. SINCE THE JANUARY 1966 TRI-CONTINENT CONFERENCE, HAVANA HAS TRAINED A NUMBER OF BOLIVIANS IN GUERRILLA WARFARE. THERE IS FIRM EVIDENCE THAT SOME MEMBERS OF THE GUERRILLA BAND WHICH HAS BEEN ACTIVE IN SOUTHEASTERN BOLIVIA SINCE MARCH 1967 ARE DRAWN FROM THIS TRAINED GROUP, AS WELL AS FROM THE PRO-SOVIET AND PRO-CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTIES. GUIDO PEREZO LEIGUE, A PRO-SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBER WHO WAS TRAINED IN CUBA, IS BELIEVED TO BE THE LEADER OF THE GUERRILLA BAND, AS WAS MOISES GUEVARA, ANOTHER BOLIVIAN GUERRILLA LEADER.
- B. MOREOVER, THERE IS STRONG EVIDENCE THAT CUBA IS DIRECTLY INVOLVED WITH THE BOLIVIAN GUERRILLAS. DEFECTORS AND CAPTURED GUERRILLAS CLAIM THAT AT LEAST SIX CUBANS ARE PRESENT IN THE GUERRILLA CAMP, AND THAT RADIO CONTACT HAS BEEN MAINTAINED WITH HAVANA. ARTICLES OF CLOTHING BEARING CUBAN MARKINGS HAVE BEEN FOUND.

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- C. THE MOST CELEBRATED CAPTURED GUERRILLA, JULES REGIS DEBRAY, IS A YOUNG FRENCH GUERRILLA WARFARE THEORETICIAN CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH FIDEL CASTRO.
- D. THE GOVERNMENT IS TRYING TO CORDON OFF THE GUERRILLA AREA, BUT ITS TROOPS IN THIS AREA ARE LARGELY CONSCRIPTS, POORLY TRAINED AND POORLY EQUIPPED, AND BADLY LED. THEY HAVE BEEN ON THE LOSING END OF MOST OF THEIR ENCOUNTERS WITH THE GUERRILLAS.
- E. A SELECTED ARMY UNIT, NOW BEING GIVEN COUNTERINSURGENCY TRAINING WILL ULTIMATELY BE SENT IN AGAINST THE GUERRILLAS, BUT THE NECESSARY TRAINING AND MOVEMENT WILL TAKE MONTHS.
- F. PRESIDENT BARRIENTOS IS EXTREMELY DISCOURAGED BY THE ARMY'S PERFORMANCE THUS FAR AND FEELS THAT THE GUERRILLAS CANNOT BE DEFEATED WITHOUT OUTSIDE SUPPORT -- BOTH TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT.
- G. MEANWHILE, THE GUERRILLA LEADERSHIP IS TRYING TO FIND ALLIES AND REINFORCEMENTS AMONG DISGRUNTLED

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EXTREMIST ELEMENTS ON THE BOLIVIAN POLITICAL SCENE. THIS IS A COUNTRY, AS RECENT HISTORY SHOWS, WHERE THE LEFT-WING MINERS BELIEVE THAT THE MOST EFFECTIVE POLITICAL ARGUMENT IS A STICK OF DYNAMITE.

GUATEMALA (MAP)

XV. CUBA HAS BEEN GIVING ASSISTANCE AND GUIDANCE TO GUATEMALAN GUERRILLA AND TERRORIST GROUPS FOR MORE THAN THREE YEARS. INITIALLY YOM SOZA'S LEFTIST-EXTREMIST "13TH OF NOVEMBER" ORGANIZATION WAS THE MAIN RECIPIENT OF THIS AID.

A. AFTER THE NOVEMBER 1964 CONFERENCE OF LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNISTS IN HAVANA, HOWEVER, CUBA CHANNELLED ITS AID EXCLUSIVELY TO THE FIGHTING ARM OF THE GUATEMALAN COMMUNIST PARTY, THE REBEL ARMED FORCES, OR F.A.R.

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B. [REDACTED] AT LEAST 15 GUERRILLA TRAINEES ARRIVED IN GUATEMALA FROM CUBA IN MID-1966, AND THAT 60 MEN WERE TO GO FROM

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GUATEMALA TO CUBA FOR SIMILAR TRAINING EARLY
LAST AUGUST.

- C. AN OLD ARGUMENT BETWEEN THE LEADERS OF THE ORTHODOX GUATEMALAN COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE LEADERS OF THE REBEL ARMED FORCES, WHO ARE MORE MILITANT AND MORE RESPONSIVE TO CASTRO INFLUENCE, HAS CONTINUED TO LESSEN COMMUNIST EFFECTIVENESS.
- D. ALTHOUGH BOTH GROUPS HAVE BEEN WEAKENED BY DISSENSION AND ARMY OPERATIONS AGAINST THEM, THEY CONTINUE TO BE EFFECTIVE IN HARASSING THE GOVERNMENT; THE F.A.R., AT LEAST, CAN COUNT ON CONTINUED CUBAN TRAINING AND FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE. BOTH GROUPS HAVE RECENTLY AGREED TO COOPERATE IN TRYING TO REVITALIZE THE "REVOLUTIONARY" MOVEMENT.

OTHER GUERRILLA POTENTIAL

XVI. GUERRILLA POTENTIAL EXISTS IN PANAMA, PERU, THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, AND PERHAPS EVEN IN BRAZIL, YOUR EXCELLENCY. SO FAR, HOWEVER, NOTHING SIGNIFICANT HAS DEVELOPED.

- A. PANAMA --- BECAUSE OF THE U.S. PRESENCE AND THE IMPORTANCE TO US OF THE CANAL --- IS HIGH ON THE

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LIST OF CASTRO'S LONG-RANGE TARGETS. ABOUT 150 PANAMANIANS, MOST OF THEM STUDENTS, HAVE RECEIVED TRAINING IN PARTY LEADERSHIP OR GUERRILLA WARFARE. DURING 1966, ABOUT 16 PANAMANIANS WENT TO CUBA FOR GUERRILLA TRAINING, AND HAVE RETURNED HOME BY NOW. THESE REVOLUTIONARIES CAN BE EXPECTED TO BE IN THE FOREFRONT OF ANY FUTURE DISORDERS.

- B. IN PERU, CUBA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH LEFTIST-EXTREMIST GROUPS HAS BEEN SEVERELY HAMPERED BY THE GOVERNMENT'S CRACKDOWN FOLLOWING THE INITIATION OF GUERRILLA ACTIVITY IN JUNE, 1965. TODAY, INSURGENT LEADERS ARE EITHER DEAD, IN JAIL, OR IN EXILE, AND THEIR ORGANIZATION IS BADLY DISRUPTED. SOME EFFORTS ARE BEING MADE BY THE REMNANTS TO REORGANIZE, BUT FUNDING AND COMMUNICATION CHANNELS HAVE NOT BEEN RESTORED.
1. SOURCES HAVE REPORTED THAT GUERRILLAS ARE ONCE AGAIN PLANNING ACTION IN SOUTHERN PERU FOR SOMETIME IN THE FUTURE, AND THAT THEY EXPECT CUBAN ASSISTANCE.

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2. INTERNAL BICKERING AND SUCCESSFUL GOVERNMENT COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS, HOWEVER, WOULD SEEM TO PRECLUDE AN INCREASE OF INSURGENT ACTIVITY IN PERU TO THE PROPORTIONS OF THE 1965 TROUBLES.

C. DIRECT CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC WAS AGAIN PROVED ON MAY 5TH WHEN THE DOMINICANS CAUGHT AN AGENT OF THE CUBAN GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE, OR D.G.I. DOMINICAN PRESIDENT BALAGUER ANNOUNCED ON MAY 8TH THAT THE AGENT, JOSE IGNACIO MARTE POLANCO, WAS IN POSSESSION OF A HIGH-POWERED RECEIVER AND TRANSMITTER, CODES AND OTHER COMMUNICATION MATERIAL. BALAGUER ANNOUNCED THAT MARTE HAD BEEN IN ACTIVE COMMUNICATION WITH HAVANA. ALSO IN HIS POSSESSION WAS A LIE DETECTOR STOLEN FROM THE DOMINICAN DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL INVESTIGATIONS DURING THE 1965 REVOLUTION.

I. MARTE HAD BEEN TRAINED IN CUBA IN COMMUNICATIONS. HE IS A MEMBER OF THE COMMUNIST DOMINICAN POPULAR MOVEMENT.

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2. PRIOR TO THE DOMINICAN INSURRECTION IN APRIL-MAY 1965, CUBA HAD PROVIDED TRAINING TO MORE THAN 50 OF THE EXTREMISTS WHO FORMED A PART OF THE VANGUARD OF THE MOVEMENT. OVER 40 EXTREMISTS CLANDESTINELY RETURNED TO THE COUNTRY FROM CUBA AND ELSEWHERE IN LATE 1964 AND EARLY 1965. ALTHOUGH THE CUBANS GAVE STRONG POLITICAL AND PROPAGANDA SUPPORT TO THE "CONSTITUTIONALISTS" OVER HAVANA RADIO AND AT THE UN, THEY WERE CAREFUL TO STEER CLEAR OF ACTIVE MILITARY INVOLVEMENT OR SUPPORT.
3. CUBA HAS CONTINUED TO PROVIDE POLITICAL AND PARAMILITARY TRAINING FOR A LIMITED NUMBER OF DOMINICANS, MAINLY MEMBERS OF THE SELF-PROCLAIMED "LENINIST" 14TH OF JUNE MOVEMENT AND THE COMMUNIST DOMINICAN POPULAR MOVEMENT. THE EXACT NUMBER OF TRAINEES LAST YEAR IS NOT KNOWN, ALTHOUGH IT MAY BE AS HIGH AS 60.
4. IDEOLOGICAL AND OTHER DIFFERENCES BETWEEN COMPETING DOMINICAN EXTREMIST PARTIES APPARENTLY HAVE CAUSED THE CUBANS TO REEXAMINE


S E C R E T

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THEIR DIRECT FINANCIAL SUPPORT. DURING THE YEAR THE CUBANS CUT OFF FUNDS TO THE 14TH OF JUNE MOVEMENT WHILE SEEKING TO ESTABLISH CLOSER TIES WITH THE M.P.D. THE CUBANS HAVE SHOWN AN INCREASING RELUCTANCE TO GRANT DIRECT FINANCIAL AID, AND INSTEAD HAVE PREFERRED TO EXTEND HELP OVER WHICH THEY HAVE SOME CONTROL SUCH AS TRAINING AND SCHOLARSHIP ASSISTANCE.

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D.



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XVII. IN SUMMARY, [REDACTED] CUBA HAS GIVEN AMPLE NOTICE THAT IT INTENDS TO CONTINUE ITS PROPAGANDA, TRAINING, AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO SELECTED REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS -- ESPECIALLY THOSE IN BOLIVIA, COLOMBIA, GUATEMALA, AND VENEZUELA. AS I HAVE INDICATED BEFORE, GUERRILLA FIGHTING IN BOLIVIA STARTED IN MARCH AND THERE HAS BEEN AN UPSURGE IN GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES IN COLOMBIA AND VENEZUELA IN THE LAST FEW MONTHS. GIVEN THE CASTRO-COMMUNIST GOAL TO DEVELOP AND EXPLOIT OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER ARMED VIOLENCE, PLUS THE VULNERABILITIES WHICH EXIST IN MANY LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, WE CAN EXPECT NEW OUTBREAKS OF COMMUNIST-SPONSORED VIOLENCE IN LATIN AMERICA. MOREOVER, CUBA IS ON RECORD AS BEING WILLING TO CONTRIBUTE TOWARD THE ESTABLISHMENT OF "MORE CUBAS AND VIETNAMS" IN LATIN AMERICA.

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XVIII. 25X1C

IN PASSING, [REDACTED] I MIGHT POINT OUT THE AMBIVALENCE OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE LAST YEAR AND A HALF, IN WHICH THEY SEEM TO BE ADVOCATING A PEACEFUL TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM ON ONE HAND, AND SUPPORT GUERRILLA MOVEMENTS ON THE OTHER. IN SPITE OF THEIR RECENT ECONOMIC AND DIPLOMATIC OVERTURES TO LATIN AMERICA, MANY SOVIET OFFICIALS AND OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS HAVE PUBLICLY MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS:

A. THE SOVIET DELEGATE TO THE JANUARY 1966 TRI-CONTINENT CONFERENCE, SHARIF R. RASHIDOV, ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT LEADERS OF THE SOVIET UNION, JOINED HIS COLLEAGUES IN A PROMISE TO SUPPORT ARMED LIBERATION MOVEMENTS AIMED TO OVERTHROW THE EXISTING GOVERNMENTS, AS MAY BE OBSERVED IN THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS:

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"THE SOVIET PEOPLE HAS ALWAYS SUPPORTED
PEOPLE'S WARS, THE ARMED STRUGGLE OF THE
OPPRESSSED PEOPLES AND HAS BEEN RENDERING
THEM EVERY POSSIBLE SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE."

"WE EXPRESS FRATERNAL SOLIDARITY WITH THE
ARMED STRUGGLE WAGED BY THE PATRIOTS OF
VENEZUELA, PERU, COLOMBIA, AND GUATEMALA
FOR FREEDOM AGAINST THE PUPPETS OF IMPER-
IALISM."

B. LATER THE FIRST SECRETARY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE
SOVIET UNION, LEONID BREZHNEV, AT A MASS MEETING HELD IN
ULAN BATOR ON 15 JANUARY, COINCIDING WITH THE CLOSING DATE
OF THE TRI-CONTINENT CONFERENCE, SAID:

"THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE PEOPLES OF
THE SOVIET UNION SEE THEIR INTERNATIONAL
DUTY IN SUPPORTING THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE
OF OTHER PEOPLES. THIS STRUGGLE PRESENTLY
ASSUMES VARIOUS FORMS, DEPENDING ON SPECIFIC
CONDITIONS AND TASKS. SOME PEOPLE HAVE TO

SECRET

DEFEND THEIR FREEDOM WITH WEAPONS IN
HAND, WHEREAS IT IS IMPORTANT FOR OTHER
PEOPLE TODAY TO STRUGGLE FOR ECONOMIC
INDEPENDENCE AND SOCIAL PROGRESS."

"WE TAKE THIS INTO CONSIDERATION IN OUR
POLICY. THIS IS WHY THERE IS VARIETY IN
OUR AID TO THESE PEOPLES: FROM POLITICAL
SUPPORT AND SUPPLIES OF ARMS TO ECONOMIC
AGREEMENTS, THE GRANTING OF CREDITS AND
PARTICIPATION IN BUILDING INDUSTRIAL
ENTERPRISES."

"MORE THAN ONCE IN THE LAST DECADE PEOPLES
STRUGGLING FOR THEIR FREEDOM AND INDEPEN-
DENCE HAVE TURNED TO MOSCOW, TO THE PARTY
OF LENIN FOR HELP AND SUPPORT. AND WE
CAN SAY WITH A PURE CONSCIENCE: IN NO
CASE DID MOSCOW REFUSE SUCH SUPPORT."

"THE UNITY OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES WITH
THE PEOPLES OF ASIA, AFRICA, AND LATIN
AMERICA IS BECOMING STRONGER IN THE STRUGGLE

SECRET

SECRET

AGAINST IMPERIALISM. THIS WAS ONCE AGAIN DEMONSTRATED BY THE HAVANA TRI-CONTINENTAL CONFERENCE. ITS DECISIONS WILL UNDOUBTEDLY FACILITATE NEW SUCCESSES IN THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE AND IN THE COHESION OF ALL ANTI-IMPERIALIST FORCES."

C. DURING THE USSR'S 21-27 MAY 1967 WEEK OF SOLIDARITY WITH LATIN AMERICAN PATRIOTS. PRAVDA, AN ORGAN OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE, COMMENTED:

"THE ARSENAL OF FORMS AND METHODS OF THE ANTI-IMPERIALIST STRUGGLE IS EXTREMELY DIVERSE. MANY THOUSANDS OF WORKING PEOPLE ARE TAKING PART IN THE MOVEMENT. IN THE STRUGGLE FOR THEIR RIGHTS AND AGAINST RE-ACTION AND DICTATORSHIP, THE WORKERS AND PEASANTS, AS WELL AS THE PROGRESSIVE INTELLECTUALS ARE USING BOTH PEACE AND VIOLENT FORMS OF STRUGGLE. IT IS VERY ACUTE IN SEVERAL COUNTRIES. THE PATRIOTS ARE TAKING UP ARMS AND COMING OUT AGAINST THE BLOODY DICTATORSHIPS AND UNPOPULAR REGIMES."

SECRET

SECRET

"INTERNATIONALISM IS A GREAT FORCE.
THE LATIN AMERICAN PATRIOTS FEEL THE
DAILY SUPPORT OF THE SOVIET UNION AND
THE SOCIALIST STATES. . .MAY THE PEOPLES
OF LATIN AMERICA KNOW THAT ALL THE
SOVIET PEOPLE--230 MILLION STRONG, SIDE
WITH THEM."

SECRET

S E C R E T

THE CUBAN POLITICAL SITUATION

- I. Although his popularity has waned considerably in the past few years, Fidel Castro is still in firm political control in Cuba.
 - A. He has recently given lip service to sharing political responsibilities but there is no evidence that he has in fact delegated any significant authority to other top regime officials.
 - B. His power position, based on tight security controls and the loyalty of key military and security officials, remains strong.
 - C. Castro is in good health. While he was apparently physically incapacitated for a brief period last summer, his many public appearances and vigorous activity in the past ten months indicate that he has no serious health problems.
- II. Continued economic hardships, forced participation in the sugar harvest, compulsory "volunteer" labor, and constant political indoctrination have caused disenchantment among many Cuban people but their reaction is passive. The ubiquitous security apparatus does not permit popular disaffection to become organized.

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- A. Clothes, food, and other consumer goods either are rationed or are in short supply. Failure of the regime to solve distribution problems and bottlenecks has further aggravated the situation and there is no relief in sight.
- B. A part of the regime's answer to such problems has been a sweeping anti-bureaucracy campaign intended to improve efficiency and increase production. For the most part, however, the campaign has had the opposite effect. Trained personnel in responsible positions have been released or replaced by ineffective but politically reliable party hacks causing further economic dislocation.
- C. There is no reason to believe, however, that the disaffected portions of the population will pose a serious threat to the regime. Disgruntled Cubans, acutely aware of the alert and efficient security apparatus, apply for passage on the Varadero-Miami airlift and passively await their date of departure instead of taking the risks involved in organizing a resistance movement. In this respect, the airlift has developed into an effective safety valve for the Castro regime.

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- III. The Cuban Revolution has not been a complete failure. Modest successes have been scored in the fields of education and public health.
- A. Although purges and emigration of experienced personnel seriously depleted the staffs of many Cuban educational institutions and lowered teaching standards, the Castro regime has devoted considerable effort to building new schools and providing educational opportunities free of charge. On 2 June, for example, it was announced that this year an additional 50,000 scholarships will be made available for Cuban youths wishing to become technicians or teachers. This will bring the number of students studying on government scholarships to 200,000.
- B. The regime has also built many small hospitals and clinics in rural areas where medical facilities had never before existed. Although the quality of medical aid has undoubtedly suffered from the emigration of several thousand experienced physicians and from an abbreviated curriculum in medical schools (medical students are graduated after only five

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years of advanced study instead of seven years), a poorly trained doctor or nurse is better than none at all.

IV. In the international sphere, there are signs of increasing Soviet vexation over Castro's independent actions both at home and abroad.

A. Despite large-scale Soviet assistance, Cuba's economy has remained stagnant due largely to poor administration, Castro's unwillingness to listen to advice, and his penchant for one-man rule with minimal delegation of authority. Two Soviet Embassy personnel in Havana recently told [redacted] 25X1X

25X1X [redacted] that Soviet-Cuban relations are deteriorating and hinted that their country is getting tired of paying to support a nation which apparently has little faith or trust in the USSR.

B. The Soviet diplomats also took exception to Castro's philosophy of violent revolution. Castro's insistence on armed struggle has alienated many of the Moscow-oriented Communist parties in Latin America which feel that the local party should be permitted to decide whether to follow the "hard" or "soft" line.

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C. On the other hand, Castro is displeased with Soviet diplomatic and commercial overtures to several Latin American governments which, he says, are tantamount to "helping to suppress the revolution." He has also been critical of what he considers Soviet foot-dragging in providing adequate support for North Vietnam and reportedly feels the USSR made another poor showing in the current Middle East crisis. He views the Soviet Union's performance in these crises as similar to its retreat during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.

25X1C

D. [REDACTED] has confirmed the deterioration in Soviet-Cuban relations and has suggested that there may be a time when the Soviet authorities will consider that Fidel is no longer essential to the Revolution.

E. Despite the frictions developing between the two countries, there is no indication that the USSR will abandon Castro to his own devices. The Soviet Union has continued its sizeable military and economic support of the regime and probably will continue to do so for the foreseeable future.

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V. Sino-Cuban relations are in a very sad state, although no formal diplomatic rupture is expected. Each country seems to want to minimize its contact with the other in contrast to much more cordial relations of past years.

A. January 1966 was the turning point. Castro delivered a stinging condemnation of the Communist Chinese for reducing their rice deliveries to Cuba and for distributing propaganda within the Cuban Armed Forces. After a brief exchange of verbal blows, Castro and the Chinese, neither wishing to provoke a formal split, adopted a policy of ignoring each other as much as possible. The Cuban press, for example, has failed to report the current Red Guard activity and turmoil in China.

B. Diplomatic representation is a good barometer of the state of Sino-Cuban relations. The Communist Chinese embassy in Havana, which once had a staff of more than 60 people, has been reduced to 8 or 9 while the Cuban Embassy in Peking has only two or three. Cuba's ambassador was recalled to Havana in May and reportedly will not return to his post.

S E C R E T

THE CUBAN ECONOMY

1. The Cuban economy has made little overall progress since the Castro regime took power and, in fact, the man-in-the-street is considerably worse off with little prospect for improvement. Though the gross national product has moved slightly above the level reached before the revolution, on a per capita basis it has declined about 10 percent, and living conditions are generally lower. Total goods available for private consumption have remained about the same since 1961 and the increase in population has meant that per capita private consumption has been steadily falling. In 1966, per capita private consumption was nearly 25 percent below the pre-revolutionary level. By no means all Cubans are worse off, however. Many in the party and military, among the students, and among those who had been extremely poor now undoubtedly find their economic lot better.

2. The year 1966 was one of economic setback for Cuba because of the poor sugar harvest--less than 4.5 million metric tons compared to more than 6 million the previous year. The primary cause of the reduced crop was a severe drought in 1965, but the application of less fertilizer was also a factor. No

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net gains were made in the industrial and construction sectors. In spite of the drought, there was a significant improvement in non-sugar agriculture, reversing the downward trend evident since 1961. This improvement was not enough, however, to offset the fall in sugar production.

3. While there was no evident decline in overall availability of foodstuffs in Cuba during 1966, a sharp cut in supplies of rice, an important Cuban staple, caused the rice ration to be reduced by half. This problem resulted from the cut in Communist China's exports of rice to Cuba from 250,000 metric tons in 1965 to 135,000 metric tons in 1966. A number of other basic foodstuffs are also still being rationed.

4. Cuba's total trade deficit in 1966 was about \$265 million, or some 45 percent larger than in 1965. Cuba's total debt to all Communist countries now runs to some \$1.3 billion. In holdings of convertible currency at the end of 1966 were some \$80 million, and its total indebtedness to non-Communist countries was close to \$100 million.

5. The output of the Cuban economy will probably ~~rise~~ ^{rise} somewhat in 1967 and 1968, primarily as a result of a rise

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in sugar production. The harvest this year is expected to be about 6.1 million metric tons (with about a dozen of Cuba's 152 mills still in operation on 19 June, the total was 6.056 million metric tons) or an increase of 1.6 million metric tons over the 1966 harvest. Even so, there will probably be little improvement in the total supply of goods.

6. Cuba's limited ability to increase imports will continue to restrict its supply of industrial raw materials, semifinished goods, and building materials. Consequently, we expect little change in either industrial production or construction activity during the next few years. The outlook for non-sugar agriculture is not so clear; on the basis of past performance there will probably be moderate gains. In sum, the general economic outlook/for only moderate gains in the next few years with little or no improvement in living conditions.

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THE CUBAN MILITARY SITUATION

1. Cuba has one of the largest, most modern, and best trained military establishments in Latin America. The Cuban Armed Forces comprise an Army, Navy, Air and Air Defense Force, and a Popular Defense Militia, all under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Armed Forces (MINFAR). A paramilitary organization called the Border Guards, operated by the Ministry of the Interior (MININT), maintains a watch over Cuba's coastline, ready to seize anyone attempting to enter or leave the country illegally.
2. Raul Castro, the younger brother of Fidel, is Armed Forces Minister in addition to being Deputy Prime Minister and Second Secretary of the Cuban Communist Party. He is currently attending a high-level school and First Vice Minister Juan Almeida, veteran of the Sierra Maestra campaign, has temporarily assumed the position of "Armed Forces Minister by Regulatory Substitution" until Raul returns. The Cuban Armed Forces are staffed by officers who have demonstrated their fidelity to the Castro regime rather than to Communism per se.
3. Although the primary mission of the Armed Forces is to defend Cuba from external attack and from internal subversion, troops are also used in the sugar harvest and for various construction and agricultural projects. Obligatory military service (SMO) for males between 16 and 26 was started in

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March 1964 with draftees serving a total of 3 years.

4. A small force of 1,000 to 2,000 Soviet military advisers and technicians remains in Cuba but all weapons and weapons systems, including those with short-range ground-to-ground, ground-to-air, and cruise missiles, are now under Cuban control. The Soviet military contingent in Cuba helps to maintain and repair some of the more sophisticated weapons and provides guidance and training in the use of the vast supplies of military equipment Cuba has received from the USSR.

5. The Cuban Army totals about 175,000 men of which 90,000 are regulars and the remaining 85,000 form a ready reserve capable of immediate call-up. The Navy has about 7,000 men while the Air Force has 4,000 and the Air Defense Force has 3,000. These are backed up by a militia of about 100,000 men and women. There are an estimated 3,000 men in the Border Guard.

6. Naval facilities afloat comprise 18 KOMAR guided missile patrol craft based on the north coast near Havana, and 24 motor torpedo boats, 15 submarine chasers, and a small fleet of lesser patrol craft distributed among the important ports on the north and south coasts. All of the larger vessels were provided by the Soviet Union. The four warships Cuba acquired prior to Castro's assumption of power, three old "frigates" of US origin and an antiquated "cruiser" built in 1912, are no longer considered effective fighting units

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and are used for training and target practice. Smaller pre-1959 coastal patrol craft supplied by the US are often out of service for lack of repairs and maintenance and most are probably being gradually deactivated. The Soviet-supplied vessels are the backbone of the Navy.

7. The Cuban ground forces are equipped with more than 1,200 field artillery pieces and antitank guns supported by over 100 130-mm, 132-mm, and 200-mm truck-mounted rocket launchers. Armored vehicles include about 600 T-34 and T-54/55 medium tanks, 40 JS-2 heavy tanks, 16 PT-76 amphibious tanks, 100 SU-100 self-propelled assault guns, and close to 300 armored personnel carriers and scout cars. The ground forces also have 8 FROG (Free-Rocket-Over-Ground) tactical missile launchers with 50 FROG missiles and 20 SALISH ground-to-ground tactical missile transporter/launchers with an estimated 100 SALISH missiles.

8. The Air Defense Force consists of 24 surface-to-air missile sites with about 600 missiles protecting three major military centers (Greater Havana, Santa Clara/Cienfuegos, and Holguin/Santiago de Cuba) and an estimated 1,500 anti-aircraft guns situated throughout the island. The antiaircraft artillery ranges from small calibre weapons up to 100-mm guns, some of which are equipped with fire control radar. The Air Defense Force has about 50 ZSU-57-2 twin-mount 57-mm self propelled guns.

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9. The Cuban Air Force has about 166 modern jet fighter planes including 23 MIG-21 aircraft with a limited all-weather capability. In all, there are 58 MIG-21, 10 MIG-19s, 35 MIG-17s, and 53 MIG-15s based at three major airfields, Holguin in the east, Santa Clara in central Cuba, and San Antonio de los Baños south of Havana. A fourth major airfield, at San Julian in western Cuba, is used principally for primary pilot training. Nearly all jet fighter pilots have received advanced training in the Soviet Union while a few have been trained in Communist China. The Air Force also has more than a dozen IL-14 twin-engine transport aircraft; although a few have been noted in practice bombing operations, most are believed to be fitted out as cargo and/or passenger carriers. In addition to about 150 light planes used for training, liaison, and command and control activity, the Air Force has over 90 helicopters, the majority of which are MI-1 HAREs and MI-4 HOUNDS.

10. An additional missile system, the SAMLET coastal defense cruise missile system, now considered obsolete in the Soviet Union, was deployed at four sites in the Havana area by the Cuban Navy until late 1966 when all sites were vacated. Since then, the 8 SAMLET launchers have remained in a storage area in a non-operational status although it seems that 4 of the launchers may be in use for training. Cuba's 50 SAMLET

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missiles are apparently also at this storage facility. The reason for the deactivation of the four sites and the future deployment of the system are not known at this time.

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11. One section of the Cuban Armed Forces has been a source of acute embarrassment to the Castro regime. This is the UMAP, or Military Units for Aid to Production. The UMAP was formed in November 1965 when the Cuban government decided to provide a cheap source of unskilled labor by inducting petty criminals, perverts, malcontents, suspected counterrevolutionaries, clergymen, and militant church members into work battalions housed in concentration camp-type complexes in Camaguey Province. In this fashion, not only was labor made available where it was needed most, those elements comprising potential stumbling blocks for the regime was eliminated from open society. Practically speaking, however, the system was a failure. Harsh discipline and abusive physical punishment meted out to UMAP members evoked protests from families and friends. UMAP units, with no incentive to work, were not noted for their productivity. Although UMAP was technically a part of the Army, troops were given no weapons or military training. They were paid 7 pesos a month and were rarely ever permitted to leave their camps on pass. They performed agricultural work, usually in the canefields, seven days

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a week from early in the morning until the evening when they were compelled to attend classes in Communist indoctrination. Such was the reaction to UMAP that both Fidel and Raul Castro were forced to make public statements backing the system. Finally, in April of this year, all UMAP members over 27 years old were given their unconditional release and there are rumors that the remaining members will be absorbed into the regular Army and the UMAP battalions will be disbanded.

12. The Cuban Armed Forces probably are in a relatively high state of preparedness and, short of a major US invasion, could successfully defend the country against external attack. They have already proven their capability to maintain internal order. Joint military training exercises, including elements of the ground, sea, and air forces, have been conducted and some units have had practical experience in operations against raids from abroad by Cuban exiles. Although there have been unconfirmed reports of poor morale, there is no reason to doubt that the majority of the regular troops are loyal to the regime. Their principal drawback is a lack of combat experience and the low level of education of the enlisted men.

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CUBAN ARMED FORCES

Personnel Strength Total 194,000 (additional 100,000 in militia)

Army (regulars)	90,000 men
(ready reserve)	85,000 men
total	175,000 men
Navy	7,000 men
Air Force	4,000 men
Air Defense Force	8,000 men
Militia	100,000 men and women

Inventory of Arms and Equipment

Jet Fighter Aircraft Total 166

MIG-15	53
U-MIG-15 (jet trainers)	10
MIG-17	35
MIG-19	10
MIG-21	58

Naval Vessels Total 123

KOMAR patrol boats	18
Kronstadt subchasers	6
SO-1 class subchasers	9 (plus 1 enroute from USSR)
P-6 motor torpedo boats	12
P-4 motor torpedo boats	12
Patrol escorts	5
Other patrol/service craft	62

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Missile Forces

FROG (Free-Rocket-Over-Ground):		
Missiles (estimated)	50	(max. range 29 nautical miles)
Launchers	8	
SAMLET Coastal Defense:		
Missiles (estimated)	50	(max. range 25 to 50 nautical miles)
Launchers	8	
SALISH Surface-to-Surface:		
Missiles (estimated)	100	(max. range 60 to 70 nautical miles)
Launchers	20	
KOMAR Patrol Boats:		
STYX missiles (estimated)	100	(max. range 20 nautical miles)
KOMAR boats (2 launchers each)	18	
GUIDELINE Surface-to-Air:		
Missiles (estimated)	600	(max. range 17 nautical miles)
Launchers	162	
Sites (6 launchers each)	24	

Artillery

Field artillery and anti-	1,230
tank guns	
ZSU-57-2 self-propelled antiaircraft	
antitank guns	50
Other antiaircraft guns	1,450
130-mm truck-mounted rocket	50
launchers (32-round)	
132-mm truck-mounted rocket	30
launchers (16-round)	
200-mm truck-mounted rocket	
launchers (4-round)	25-30

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Armor

T-34 medium tanks	450
T-54/55 medium tanks	150
JS-2 heavy tanks	40
PT-76 amphibious tanks	16
SU-100 self-propelled assault guns	100
BTR-50p armored personnel carriers	40
BTR-60p armored personnel carriers	95
BTR-152 armored personnel carriers	40
BRMD amphibious scout cars	60
K-61 amphibious personnel carriers	60

Small arms estimated 300,000 weapons

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CINR Special Article

26 June 1967

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THE LASO CONFERENCE

On 28 July 1967, delegates representing every Latin American country will gather in Havana for the first Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO) conference. This meeting may lay the groundwork for shifting the future path of Latin American Communism away from urban proletarianism toward rural guerrilla insurgency. The delegates will almost certainly exacerbate the already existing tensions between Castroite militants and pro-Soviet Communists.

LASO was founded by 27 militant Latin American delegations immediately after the January 1966 Tri-Continent Conference in order to "coordinate the struggle against US imperialism." In August 1966, an organizing committee consisting of representatives from Cuba, Brazil, Colombia, Guyana,

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Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela met to plan for the 1967 conference. In October, this committee issued a draft agenda, obviously inspired by Fidel Castro's militant foreign policy, which basically called for discussion of a common, armed-insurrection strategy for all Latin American revolutionary movements to achieve national liberation. It also issued a call for the creation of national LASO committees in the various Latin American countries.

The formation of these national committees, which will send delegates to the July conference, appears to be causing great problems. Thus far, only the Chilean, Colombian, and, of course, Cuban delegations have been officially established.

In Chile, the more militant Socialist Party had accused its Communist-coalition partners of subordination to Soviet interests and failure to support national liberation

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movements --- thus eliminating them from the right to LAFO participation. The Communists denied these charges, protesting that they merely wanted "adventurers" excluded from the delegation. The recently formed national committee, however, despite what must have been strong Communist objections, is heavily weighted in favor of the Socialists. Their delegation members include such Castro-admirers as perennial presidential hopeful and Senate president, Salvador Allende, and a recent visitor to Havana, Senator and Socialist Party Secretary General, Aniceto Rodriguez.

The Colombian national committee, like the Chilean, contains some orthodox Communist Party members, but also includes a heavy complement from the insurgent Army of National Liberation and the extremist Worker-Student-Peasant Movement.

The obvious pro-Castro militant tenor of the proceedings, thus far, has reportedly caused the orthodox Venezuelan

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Communist Party to decide against sending a delegation -- apparently leaving Venezuelan representation open to the pro-Castro Armed Forces of National Liberation and other guerrilla groups. On the other hand, the Uruguayan Socialist Party has caused a hassle in Montevideo by accusing the Communist-controlled Leftist Liberation Front of excluding it and other extremists from representation.

Whatever the outcome of these arguments, it is becoming increasingly clear -- from the organizing committee's provocative declarations and Castro's stated dissatisfaction with Latin American pro-Soviet Communist Parties -- that the hemisphere is going to witness an open ideological struggle between Castroite insurgents and orthodox Communists. The Cuban leader has apparently become completely convinced that his revolution, beginning with a small guerrilla nucleus and

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accomplished without Soviet or Chinese assistance, is the only true example for others to follow to national liberation. Thus, the July LASO conference will be used as a forum to appeal to Latin Americans to band together in "red beret" groups in order to begin a true revolutionary struggle.

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COMMUNIST CHINA'S LATIN AMERICAN ACTIVITIES

I. CHINA'S SMALL ROLE IN LATIN AMERICAN INSURGENCY

1. Communist China, like Cuba, has moved to exploit the conflict between the cautious orthodox Latin American Communist Party leaders and their more impatient and adventurous followers who are anxious to initiate guerrilla warfare. Thus, China has been supplying a great deal of bombastic anti-US propaganda, but a small and undetermined amount of training and funds to various dissident groups. The real Chinese purpose in this venture appears to be the recruitment of adherents in Peking's struggle with Moscow for world Communist leadership rather than the promotion of insurgency in Latin America.

2. Peking's ambitions in Latin America, whatever they may be, have been thwarted in recent years by their complete inability to attract many supporters. This, of course, is due to competition from the long-established pro-Soviet Communist Parties on one hand, and rivalry for leadership of the armed struggle movement with the Castroites on the other. Those who advocate guerrilla activity in Latin America apparently prefer Castro to Mao by a wide margin.

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3. Therefore, in recent years, relatively few prospective Latin American insurgents have gone to China to study guerrilla warfare. Moreover, some sources have indicated that Peking has now halted the inflow of foreign trainees because of internal political unrest. Competition for promising revolutionaries of either the orthodox or insurgent stripe has, thus, been left to the Soviets and Cubans.

II. PROPAGANDA

1. The Department of Propaganda of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, and the Administrative Bureau of the Radio Broadcasting System of the Council of State are the bodies directly responsible for all propaganda broadcast on the radio.

2. Since 1961, the weekly schedule of Radio Peiping broadcasts in Spanish, directed at the countries of Latin America, amounts to 28 hours (14 to South America; 7 to Cuba, Panama, and Colombia; and 7 to Central America and Mexico). Radio Peiping devotes 14 hours per week to Portuguese-language broadcasts aimed at Brazil.

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4. The Chinese publications in Spanish and Portuguese are also distributed under the responsibility of the Propaganda Department. These publications have a carefully prepared format, fine quality paper, and tasteful illustrations and photographs, which give an attractive, albeit false, image of daily life in China.

III. POLITICAL ROLE

1. Small, authentic pro-Chinese Communist Parties have been established in Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru. Only the Chilean party, however, functions legally. These groups^{combined} have less than 10,000 members and have shown no capacity to attract a larger following.

IV. CHINESE ACTIVITY IN SEVERAL COUNTRIES

A. Argentina

1. Sino-Argentine trade relations increased during the 1962-1966 period, although there were no diplomatic relations or inter-government contacts. Since the 1966 coup in Argentina, with the assumption of power of a strongly anti-Communist government, trade has decreased. However,

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the sale of 100,000 tons of Argentine corn was negotiated in May 1967. China received 1.6 million tons of Argentine wheat from the 1965-66 crop.

2. Leftist Peronists as well as more moderate Peronists and trade union delegations visited China before Onganía came to power; there has been no reported travel by Argentines to China since June 1966. Prior to Onganía, Chinese publications were sold openly in Argentina and a Chinese cultural association was established. The office of NCNA was closed in 1965, but they still maintain a stringer in Buenos Aires. Since June 1966, no Communist publications are sold openly, although some are available through illegal channels, including those from China.

3. The Chinese have had limited success on the ideological plane. The PCA is strongly loyal to Moscow and only a fringe group of pro-Peking militants have refused to follow this line.

B. Brazil

1. Sino-Brazilian relations, and consequently Chinese Communist activities in Brazil, have gone through two quite

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distinct phases. Before 1964, under the presidency of Goulart especially, economic bonds were formed (for example, in February 1964, China established a permanent, albeit unofficial, trade bureau in Rio de Janeiro), as well as bonds of friendship and culture (Brazil has sent more visitors to China than most other countries of Latin America, and since 1954, a Sino-Brazilian Cultural Society has existed in Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, and Brasilia), finally political bonds through the 1960 installation of an office of the New China News Agency, whose officials, Wang Wei-chen and Chou Chi-tung, proved to be particularly active.

2. After the toppling of Goulart, various political house-cleaning measures were taken which dealt very hard blows to Communist activities in general, and the Chinese ones in particular. Investigations in early 1964 by the Brazilian police led to the discovery of sabotage plans laid within a front organization -- the China-Brazil Cultural Institute, and even a cache of weapons. Other evidence pointed to the establishment of an important subversive apparatus. On 3 April 1964, the members of the Chinese trade mission were arrested, as well as the personnel of

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the New China News Agency (all nine were expelled in 1966 after being convicted of subversion). There are no longer any trade relations between the two countries, the New China News Agency has been closed, and all the Communist Parties are still outlawed.

C. Chile

1. Chile has had a privileged place in the heart of the Chinese Communists. On the commercial level, a Chinese office of Commercial Information has existed in Chile since 1961. Its managers have zealously concluded various trade agreements — such as the 1963 sale of 10,000 tons of copper to China, for 8 million dollars payable at the high rate; and 5,000 tons of refined Chilean copper, for 7 million dollars in 1964, when a Chinese Trade Fair opened its doors in Santiago. In 1965, China acquired 30,000 tons of Chilean nitrate and 48 tons of iodine; it also signed an agreement for the purchase of 40,000 tons of Chilean saltpeter, and later 6,000 tons of electrolyzed copper.

2. Exchanges and delegations between China and Chile not only involve trade, but also cultural and political life. A Sino-Chilean Friendship Association is charged with

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developing these relations, while since 1952, the Sino-Chilean Cultural Institute has published a monthly called Peoples China, and has received the few Chinese students sent by Peiping to Latin America. In May 1963, it organized a "Chinese Youth Week" to commemorate the anniversary of the Chinese intellectual revolutionary movement. Chinese films, books, and theatrical presentations, as well as Sino-Chilean athletic competitions are offered to the public on the occasion of various festivities, such as this Youth Week or the Chinese Trade Fair.

3. A number of small pro-China parties have developed with a total membership of about 2,000. Their influence on Chilean politics is negligible. Trade with China has slacked off recently, and Chilean businessmen show little interest in expanding it.

D. Mexico

1. Mexico, like Chile, has been of great interest to Communist China on the commercial plane. Peiping held an industrial-commercial exposition in Mexico in 1963. Until recently, Mexican cotton was being shipped to the Chicoms,

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but Mexican insistence on payment in hard currency has brought this trade to a halt for the present. Mexican wheat has not been shipped to Communist China since the spring of 1964. The fact that commercial activity between the two countries has almost completely dried up for the present does not, however, rule out future cash sales by Mexico to Communist China.

2. Chicom political activity in Mexico has been through two rival Sino-Mexican friendship societies and through the New China News Agency in Mexico. Until the fall of 1966, NCNA had three "correspondents" in Mexico, but these were recalled home, apparently because their political efforts in Mexico had been ineffective. NCNA is believed to retain representation now through a stringer. There has been speculation but no clear evidence that the departure of the three Chinese followed indications of their involvement with subversive activities of Mexican Trotskyists.

3. Chinese Communist propaganda circulates in Mexico largely through the efforts of the friendship societies. Communist Chinese activities have little or no support from the larger Marxist, Soviet-oriented parties in Mexico.

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E. Uruguay

1. China has been very active in Uruguay and obviously has tried to establish a propaganda center there. In 1961 the large New China News Agency (NCNA) office in Montevideo closed down but the NCNA has maintained a representative there and recently the agency had high hopes of reopening its office. Peiping's publications are distributed primarily by the Nativa Libros company --- over 10,000 magazines and pamphlets a month are made cheaply available in addition to some 3,000 magazines a month to which individual Uruguayans subscribe.

2. Some very prominent Uruguayans have traveled to China and Chinese, including a trade group in 1964, have visited Uruguay. The Chinese, however, have been unsuccessful in establishing a permanent Commercial Mission in the country. Although support for the Chinese can be found at high government levels, there are no economic or diplomatic relations between the two nations. On the strictly political level, the pro-Chinese groups, whose members often go to China for training, are quite small and far from being united.

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CUBA'S DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECURITY

1. The Department of State Security (DSE) is that part of Cuba's Ministry of the Interior that is responsible for counterintelligence and political repression. Its chief is Captain Jose Abrantes Fernandez, member of the Cuban Communist Party Central Committee. The DSE, which has about 2,000 officers and enlisted men, maintains its national headquarters in the headquarters building of the Interior Ministry in Vedado, Havana.

2. DSE branch offices have been set up in Cuba's six provincial capitals and on the Isle of Pines while smaller DSE units can be found ⁱⁿ cities, towns, and villages. These offices have jurisdiction over crimes against the state, which includes treason, espionage, counter-revolutionary activity, and so-called "economic" crimes. Individuals suspected of such crimes are investigated, arrested, interrogated, and imprisoned by organs of the DSE. Officials of the DSE play leading roles in the trials of suspected offenders, which frequently end in the death

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sentence. Those not executed are incarcerated in prisons operated by another Interior Ministry organization, the Directorate of Penitentiaries, but the prisons are staffed to a large extent by DSE personnel.

3. The DSE Public Operations Division works in the open, performing such tasks as guarding DSE buildings; conducting investigations, searches, seizures, and arrests; carrying out executions; maintaining files and dossiers; operating DSE communications facilities and cryptographic systems; protecting foreign dignitaries in Cuba and high ranking Cuban officials both at home and abroad; accompanying Cuban delegations visiting other countries to prevent defections; and maintaining a system of diplomatic couriers for the Cuban Foreign Ministry.

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5. Thanks largely to Soviet assistance and technical support, the DSE has developed into an alert and efficient security apparatus which has earned the respect of the Cuban people. Such is the popular estimate of the DSE that disgruntled Cubans, rather than taking the risk of organizing a resistance movement, chose to apply for emigration via the Varadero-Miami airlift and passively wait for deliverance. It is significant that the large majority of the Cuban refugees arriving in Miami agree that the chance of a successful uprising in Cuba is extremely remote.

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SOVIET TRAINING IN THE INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL OF MARXISM-LENINISM
IN MOSCOW CONCERNING THE REVOLUTION IN LATIN AMERICA

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I.

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[REDACTED] armed conflict and peaceful revolution are the two theses taught. The first is inevitable in every Latin American country for ultimate Communist victory, while the second is the ideal way to establish a Communist government. Since the US Government will not allow a Communist take-over of any Latin American country, however, Latin Americans will have to resort to armed struggle at some point in order to establish a Communist government.

2. Many of the less progressive Latin American countries cannot obtain a constitutional victory through "via pacifica" simply because they have not developed a large organized working class. Therefore, they must resort to guerrilla warfare with campesino support as an alternative method for obtaining power. The determination for the use of "via pacifica" or guerrilla warfare must be determined by each local party. In practice, however, especially in Latin America, the final phase of "via pacifica" will always

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necessitate armed conflict in reaction to US intervention. Furthermore, no matter what method is agreed upon by the local party, the Soviet Union is ready and willing to offer whatever support necessary to prepare them for the inevitable armed conflict, including arms and guerrilla training.

3. The differences in Soviet and Cuban positions concerning the path of the Latin American revolutionary movement were cited as follows: the basic Soviet position is that the revolution in any Latin American country should be controlled and coordinated by the local Communist party since they are the ones most knowledgeable of the area and immediate situation. Fidel Castro was criticized for training guerrillas without the coordination or the permission of the local Communist Parties involved. The Soviets said that Castro, in his zeal to be the maximum leader of the Latin American Communists, is guilty of meddling in the local party's internal affairs. This is against Soviet policy since the USSR relies on the local party's plenum to resolve internal conflicts. Moreover, the unilateral smuggling of arms by the Cubans to Latin America has provided no assistance to disciplined pro-Moscow Communist Parties but rather has gone

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to support "extreme revolutionaries." In spite of these conflicts, however, all instructors at the school pointed out that the USSR wants to maintain close and friendly relations with Castro.



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CUBAN TRAINING FROM 1960 - 1966

The listing given below is the result of studying and compiling figures taken from many sources and is to be considered as a median estimate taking into account the reliability of the sources plus the political climate in each country. In this way many extreme reports have been discarded. The figures are believed to be valid through 1966, but it should be remembered that the training has continued and courses are presently in progress. It should also be remembered that the Cubans also send training cadres to other countries where they train nationals of the host country, and of neighboring countries as well. It would be impossible to estimate the numbers affected by this system. (NOTE: These figures represent numbers of people who have had a variety of training in Cuba, including academic training and guerrilla warfare training.)

Latin America

Argentina - 104

Brazil - 75

Bolivia - 60, plus 10 who started training in November 1966

Chile - 400 to 500

Colombia - 183

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Costa Rica - 75

Dominican Republic - ca. 150, however, many Dominicans are "missing" and are suspected of being in training.

Ecuador - 147

El Salvador - 56

Guatemala - At least 170, but figures are not available for the years of 1965 and 1966, which might raise the total to over 250.

Guyana - 55 through 1964, but it is known that more have left and returned in small boats with no record of their travel.

Haiti - 36, however, thousands of Haitians have received training with the Cuban Army and hundreds of these are usable by Cuba.

Honduras - 49

Jamaica - 16

Mexico - None reported

Nicaragua - 106

Panama - 36

Paraguay - 74

Peru - 157

Uruguay - No positive reports

Venezuela - 185 with 29 in training in mid-1966.

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GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING IN CUBA

1. The scope of training varies with the time available.

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[REDACTED] received basic training covering cross-country movement of guerrillas, use and maintenance of weapons, and basic guerrilla tactics.

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[REDACTED] devoted more than 10 weeks of training to weaponry, communications, the fortification of defense positions, combat tactics, general strategy, map-reading, security, and sabotage.

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[REDACTED] considerable time devoted to political indoctrination and physical conditioning.

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2.

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[REDACTED] The subjects included how to prepare ambushes; map-reading; small arms, including instruction in weapons of several different countries; heavy and light machine guns; bazookas; light anti-tank weapons of US design; grenade throwing; as well as the manufacture and use of home-made bombs and mines. Other returning trainees have stated that guerrilla warfare students

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receive practical training alongside Cuban forces operating against counterrevolutionary elements inside Cuba.

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3. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] was required to fill out an extensive questionnaire aimed at developing targets in the homeland for sabotage, subversion of military and police, illegal entry and movement, operation of dummy business concerns to cover clandestine operations, and possible zones for air-drops.

4. Extensive use is still made of Che Guevara's book on guerrilla warfare. The trainees also use a handbook by Alberto Bayo, former colonel in the Spanish Republican air force who trained the original guerrilla group with which Castro invaded the Sierra Maestra. Thousands of copies of these books, in Spanish and in Portuguese, have been printed or mimeographed and are circulating in Latin America. Some have been specifically revised for individual countries.

5. We also have reports of related courses of instruction, lasting as much as six to eight months, in such fields as espionage, psychological warfare, political action, agent communications, and military medicine.

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6. The instruction is carried out by Cuban Army personnel under the direction of the DGI. There are some reports of Spanish instructors. Bayo himself is too old to participate actively, but apparently has an "emeritus" connection. General Enrique Lister has been reported to be associated with guerrilla training.

7. Reports of trainees indicate that weapons training is confined to weapons they will be able to obtain, maintain, and replenish in their own countries. We have reliable and corroborative reports that trainees and sponsoring leaders alike have been told Cuba does not intend to supply weapons because a guerrilla must be self-sustaining. It should be noted that while Cuba does supply some funds, guerrilla handbooks also suggest that bank robberies make guerrillas self-sufficient in this respect. Leftist militants have in fact resorted to robberies in Peru, Venezuela, Argentina, Guatemala and elsewhere.

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SOVIET SUPPORT OF CUBA

1. It is safe to say that without the full backing of the USSR, the Castro regime in Cuba would not long endure. The Soviet Union recognizes that Cuba represents one of the few victories for the Communist camp in recent years and is the only Communist breakthrough in the Western Hemisphere.

2. Although relations between the two countries have deteriorated somewhat due principally to the peculiarities of Fidel Castro's personality, the USSR has continued to give Cuba its political support through its propaganda organs and in international forums. The USSR may grow weary of Castro's messianic behavior but it will not cease its support of Cuba as a member of the Socialist camp.

3. So highly do the Soviets think of Cuba that the little Caribbean island has become the largest single recipient of Soviet economic aid. Over the span of 1962 through 1966, Cuba has used up nearly \$1.1 billion in economic credits and grants from the USSR. This compares with Soviet disbursements of economic aid in the same period of \$518 million for India, \$331 million for Afghanistan, and

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\$251 million for the United Arab Republic.

4. In addition to providing credits and grants to Cuba, the USSR has been purchasing sugar from Cuba at prices considerably higher than world prices for most of the period since 1961. The USSR paid 4 cents a pound for Cuban sugar in 1961 and 1962; it has paid 6 cents a pound since then. In January 1964, the Soviet government agreed to buy the following amounts of Cuban sugar at the 6 cent rate: 2.1 million tons in 1965, 3 million tons in 1966, 4 million tons in 1967, and 5 million annually in 1968, 1969, and 1970.

5. In addition to economic aid of monumental proportions, Soviet military aid to Cuba has amounted to more than \$700 million. The Cuban Armed Forces are now equipped almost entirely with guns, tanks, missiles, planes, and naval vessels provided by the USSR since 1961. The Cuban military inventory includes such sophisticated weapons as tactical surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles, MIG-21FL all-weather aircraft, 100-mm radar-controlled antiaircraft guns, guided-missile firing coastal patrol boats, and tanks equipped with infra-red night sighting devices. The volume of equipment is equally impressive: several hundred aircraft including more than 160 jet fighterplanes; over 650 medium and heavy tanks; 100 self-propelled 100-mm assault

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guns; more than 1,200 field artillery pieces and antitank guns; and about 1,500 antiaircraft guns.

6. Soviet technical assistance to Cuba is also important. There are about 2 or 3,000 Soviet technicians aiding the Cubans in mining, industrial, and agricultural projects with another 2,000 military advisers working with the Cuban Armed Forces. The Cuban Ministry of the Interior, particularly those branches dealing with intelligence and counterintelligence, has also benefited greatly from Soviet advisers and technical support.

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REVOLUTION WITHIN THE REVOLUTION

A. Blueprint for Revolution

The French Marxist, Regis Debray, who was captured by the Bolivian Army in a clash with guerrillas on April 19, echoes many of Castro's views on armed revolution in his book Revolucion en la Revolucion. He insists that the struggle for power in Latin America must begin with guerrilla movements in the countryside and urges Communist Parties to abandon the cities to join the guerrillas.

Debray's thesis, including the rejection of the traditional methods of the Latin American Communist Parties, closely follows Castro's line. In fact his book was written after conversations with the Cuban leader and was published in January with Cuban Government backing. The book's preface points out that Debray had shared the life of the guerrillas in various Latin American countries and calls him "one of the most lucid interpreters of the present Latin American scene".

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But Debray's capture -- announced by the French Embassy in La Paz -- appears to have caused embarrassment in some quarters. The Mexican extreme left-wing magazine, Sucesos, claimed on April 28 that he was one of its staff and that he was among the guerrillas as a working journalist. Before his capture was confirmed, the Cuban Communist Party newspaper, Granma, implied that the news had been spread in an attempt to implicate Cuba in the Bolivian guerrilla struggle and called for proof of his capture.

B. Guerrilla failures

In his book, Debray's first aim is to disprove the widely held conviction that the Cuban Revolution cannot be repeated. He admits that he had believed this until recently, and in two previous articles on Latin America he lamented that the Cuban success had raised the level of material and ideological preparation among the Latin American governments rather than among the revolutionary vanguards. Attempts to launch a guerrilla war had failed in Argentina, Paraguay, the Dominican Republic and Peru. Even in Revolución en la Revolución Debray warns that "the enemy" has increased his

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vigilance. The army and rural guards enjoy a certain prestige; communications have been improved under the guise of "technical and social assistance" and members of the Peace Corps have been integrated in the rural areas as a result of "hard work, patience and at times real self-denial". In view of this and of their superior military power, the present governments' resources should not be underestimated, but Debray's advice seems to be more a recipe for survival than a solution to the problem of seizing political power, despite his statement that the capture of power is the only legitimate aim of revolutionary movements.

Debray attributes the failure of such movements to the adoption of "imported political schemes, disguised as military tactics and applied to historical conditions very different from those in which the schemes took root". In particular he attacks the accepted concepts of armed self-defense, armed propaganda, a permanent guerrilla base and the subordination of the guerrillas to the party. Each of these, he claims, was ignored by Castro. He prescribes Cuban solutions to problems faced by all Latin American movements, despite his assertions in an earlier essay that

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there was no continental unity in Latin America and that unlike Cuba, all Latin American revolutions would have to rely on their own resources. But he also claims that the Cuban strength lay in the fact that Castro did not have any set ideology or tactics but improvised.

Armed self-defense is attacked by Debray as a tactic doomed to failure, since it involves the whole peasant community and is concerned more with the rights of the community than with the capture of power. The peasant community encumbers the guerrilla movement, he says, removes the possibility of initiative and presents too weak a challenge to the government forces. He cites the examples of Colombia where the Marquetalia independent peasant republic, supported by the Communists, was abolished in 1964, and Bolivia where the miners' strike, led by the union leader, Lechin, was defeated in 1966. The Peruvian Trotskyist, Hugo Blanco, the Brazilian peasant leader, Francisco Juliao, and the Guatemalan guerrilla, Yon Sosa, are criticized for trying to awaken the latent spontaneity of worker or peasant, thus denying the importance of an

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armed detachment such as the Cuban one, organically independent of the civil population. The Colombian Communist Party, however, has not abandoned the principle of armed self-defense, and an article in the February issue of the World Marxist Review seemed to be directed at critics like Debray. "He who claims that the mass self-defense organization is 'passive' and that 'it regards the revolutionary mass struggle' is ill-acquainted with the history of the peasant and armed struggle in our country", it said.

C. Armed propaganda rejected

Debray also rejects armed propaganda, a tactic accepted by the Chinese and the North Vietnamese, because it also reveals the presence of the guerrillas to the government forces and does not convince the peasants. He adds that even if the peasants were persuaded to join the guerrillas, there would be nothing with which to arm them. Although he admits that there are many advocates of propaganda following an ambush he again points to the Cuban example - "Significant details: in two years of war, Fidel did not hold a single meeting in his area of operations". Only at a much later stage, and one not yet reached by any Latin American guerrilla movement, does Debray allow for speeches and broadcasts to the peasants to explain the aims of the revolution.

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He does not accept the traditional Asian Communist idea of permanent guerrilla bases from which to direct operations. In his opinion this is a mistake deriving from an over-optimistic estimate of the guerrillas' strength in relation to the superior combat forces of the Latin American governments. And as in Peru, where Luis de la Puente set up several guerrilla bases while erroneously claiming to be following the Cuban example, such a mistake was suicidal wherever the rural population was scattered, where there were no frontiers with friendly countries and where there were enemy troops ready to be transported by air. Debray reminds potential revolutionaries that the attempt by "Che" Guevara -- the former Cuban leader who disappeared in 1965 -- to establish a base with hospital and communications in 1957 was a 'catastrophe'. Survival of a guerrilla movement must depend on surprise and mobility. But the first clash with the Bolivian guerrillas in March -- in which Debray was captured -- occurred when government troops came upon a camp which, according to Press reports, was equipped with a hospital.

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Debray believes that the traditional dependence of the guerrilla movement on a town-based political party has accounted for much of the revolutionary movements' present weakness. Guerrilla leaders often have to enter the towns for consultations or to receive orders, and this inevitably leads to their death sooner or later. Debray refers to the so-called "suicide", presumably of the Venezuelan guerrilla fighter Fabricio Ojeda last summer, and to "strange hazards like a car accident", presumably that of the Guatemalan, Turcios Lima. Moreover, the guerrillas are materially dependent on the town leaders who tend to forget their existence and are ignorant of their problems. Debray warns that this dependence often leads to the abandonment of the guerrilla struggle. He is clearly thinking of the Venezuelan Communist Party, recently attacked by Castro, when he refers to "bourgeois" comrades softened by city life.

D. Traditional ideas attacked

Debray attacks the traditional pro-Soviet Latin American Communist Parties for clinging to old "discredited" conceptions such as the theory of united fronts and the

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alliance of the four classes, including the national bourgeoisie. Castro also relied on the national bourgeoisie for support during the revolutionary struggle and in the first few years of power, but Debray ignores this. In an earlier essay on revolutionary strategy in Latin America, he laid much of the blame for the adoption of a national democratic line by many Communist Parties on the Soviet Communist Party's 20th Congress in 1956. He cites the Chilean emphasis on peaceful tactics, the assessment of the Colombian and Peruvian Communist Parties that violent revolution is inevitable but that conditions are not yet ripe and that all methods should be used. The Peruvians are now concentrating on improving their legal position and on infiltrating the trade unions. Debray also mentions the defense of the peaceful path by the Mexican, Argentinian and Brazilian Communists. He considers that these orthodox parties tend to scorn the peasants and devote themselves to the urban proletariat to the detriment of the guerrillas -- a view shared by "Che" Guevara. While the armed struggle was the subject of much organization of strikes, in "1001 international democratic bodies", and in the organization of the party that they failed to become informed of the military aspect of national liberation. They yielded to "the electoral opinion".

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E. "Sabotage" by both factions

Debray is equally sceptical of the pro-Chinese Communist Parties' ability to take part in the guerrilla struggle. Although some "Marxist-Leninist groups" were formed to hasten the armed struggle which they accused the "revisionists" of sabotaging, they had done nothing but insist on their right be the "proletariat's political vanguard" and had, in their turn, sabotaged the armed struggle. They had even condemned those who tried to put their propaganda into practice. Debray confesses that revolutionary groups, seriously trying to undertake the armed struggle, find themselves more persecuted by so-called "Marxist-Leninist" parties than by the governments they are opposing.

He rejects the creation of national fronts by the Communist parties to direct the armed struggle — such as the Venezuelan FLM. These tended to impose a rigid organization on the guerrillas and reverse the natural development of a liberation front from a guerrilla nucleus. Such formulae also prevented the formation of a centralised executive political-military leadership, which was essential to a successful armed struggle.

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Advising the Communist Parties to abandon the cities and join the guerrilla struggle, Debray said the internal structure of the parties will have to be dismantled and the principle of democratic centralization suspended in favour of obedience to the military leader. Many Communist leaders would be automatically excluded from playing a part in the struggle because they were physically unfit for the rigours of guerrilla life. If the Communist Parties failed to take to the mountains then the role of revolutionary vanguard would pass into other hands. Debray again quotes Castro: "Who will make revolution in Latin America? The people, the revolutionaries, with the party or without the party".

F. Military nucleus first

Although he thus offers an opportunity to the Communist Parties to join in the guerrilla struggle, Debray never allows the political to precede the military power. Again taking the example of the Cuban revolution, he insists on the creation of a military nucleus in the first instance. Castro, he recalls, had no connections with the Cuban Popular Socialist (Communist) Party, in the early stages. As the guerrilla movement advanced, it should take on the responsibilities of the political vanguard in the name of the

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workers and peasants. Most of the Cuban leaders were not old guard Communists but former guerrillas, and the Cuban revolution had shown the possibility of forging politico-military men through the revolutionary process.

Debray thus sees the guerrilla nucleus as the embryonic ruling party and decries the feasibility of the reverse and traditionally accepted process, that of creating a guerrilla nucleus from a purely political movement. He goes further than Guevara who, in an article on guerrilla warfare, conceived of the guerrilla army, and not the party, as the striking force but still held that the party should guide the workers in their struggle to seize power. But the existence of a revolutionary consciousness does not have to precede revolutionary action.

It is unlikely that Debray's theses will gain acceptance among the orthodox Latin American Communist Parties or even the pro-Chinese Communist Parties which assign the leading role to the party. So far there have been no moves to order the party members to the mountains. A statement from the Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT) after Castro's March 13 speech did suggest that all party members should take an

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part in the guerrilla struggle. But this was followed by another, signed by the Secretary-General, to the effect that no such decision had been taken. Instead Debray's book, as well as Guevara's article and Castro's increasingly provocative speeches, will probably encourage a few die-hard guerrillas without party support and antagonize still further the Latin American Communists.

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Cuban Subversive Activities in Uruguay 1959 - 1967

1. The Cuban embassy in Montevideo began disseminating pro-Cuban propaganda soon after Castro came to power. This activity and the Cuban ambassador's support for Communist-inspired demonstrations led the Uruguayan government to declare him persona non grata in January 1961. Following the ambassador's expulsion, Cuba began to take precautions to preserve Montevideo as a gateway and base of operations against neighboring countries, and virtually stopped activities against the Uruguayan government itself.

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listed Cuban intelligence operations and objectives in Uruguay as follows: enlistment of support for the Castro regime through monetary support of persons, political parties, and newspapers friendly to Cuba; penetration of exile organizations for purposes of subversion in Paraguay and Argentina; the facilitation of travel to Cuba for training and other purposes; and the penetration of the government, political parties, and organizations, to attain

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information on Uruguayan plans and operations.

3. When Uruguay finally severed diplomatic relations on 8 September 1964, Cuba lost its base of operations in South America. Clandestine subversive support activities were then left to the Uruguayan Communist Party, whose leader, Rodney Arismendi, exercises national influence through a front-party called FIDEL. Arismendi, a Castro friend and admirer, has recently engaged in efforts to bring about a detente between Castro's theory of armed revolution and Soviet advocacy of peaceful political tactics in Latin America.

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Cuban Subversive Activities in Dominican Republic 1959 - 1967

1. On 14 June 1959, a Cuban-mounted invasion force landed by plane in the Dominican Republic; a second force landed by sea on the 20th. Most of the invaders, which numbered more than 200, were eventually either killed or captured after several weeks of fighting and heavy Dominican military casualties. On 25 June the Dominican Republic broke off diplomatic relations.

2. During 1962, the provisional Council of State, which was preparing the country for its first free elections in more than 30 years, was the major target for Cuban subversion. A cadre of Dominican Communists was headquartered in Cuba, and clandestine contact was maintained with sympathizers inside the Dominican Republic.

3. Following the inauguration of President Juan Bosch in February 1963, prominent Dominican Communist and pro-Castro leaders returned to the country. With their return there was a significant increase in Communist agitation and pro-Castro activity. One member of the Communist-

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dominated Dominican Popular Movement (MPD), who was deported in late 1962 for subversive activity, was barred from entering the country in April 1963. Reportedly, he had \$50,000 in his possession which he had obtained in Cuba for the MPD's use. Included in the number of returnees were several leaders of the Dominican Communist Party (PCD) who had lived in Cuba since Trujillo rose to power.

4. In December 1963, the 14th of June Revolutionary Movement (MR-1J4) and the MPD initiated a short lived guerrilla campaign. A number of the participants in this ill-fated effort, which enjoyed vocal propaganda support from Havana radio, had received paramilitary training in Cuba and the Cubans aided the efforts with arms and ammunition. Cuba also quickly responded with propaganda support for a transit workers' strike in May 1964.

5. Cuba provided training to more than 50 of the extremists in the forefront of the Dominican insurrection in April - May 1965. Over 40 extremists clandestinely returned to the country from Cuba and elsewhere in late 1964 and early 1965. Although the Cubans gave strong political and

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propaganda support to the "constitutionalists" over Havana radio and at the UN, they were careful to steer clear of active military involvement or support.

6. Recently, the Cubans have shown an increasing reluctance to grant direct financial aid to Dominican extremists and instead have preferred to extend help over which they have some control such as training and scholarship assistance. On 8 May 1967, however, President Balaguer announced that his government had caught a Dominican agent of Cuba's DGI red-handed. The agent, a member of the NPD, was captured with his communications and code apparatus intact. According to Balaguer, the agent had been making daily radio reports to Havana on the Dominican situation.

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Cuban Subversive Activities in Jamaica 1959 - 1967

1. The Cuban Consulate in Kingston, the only Cuban representation in the Caribbean, has continued active contact with some of Jamaica's left-wing leaders, and has promoted direct contacts with Havana. The consulate's large staff is made up entirely of Cuban intelligence operators.

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2. The consul, Armando Velasquez Fernandez, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] who was expelled from El Salvador in 1960, may have been responsible for the quiet absorption of the Communist-front Unemployed Workers Council by the leftist Young Socialist League during the summer of 1966. Earlier, the Cubans had given promises of financial assistance if leftist organizations achieved unity. Information obtained in late 1966, however, suggested that Havana does not wish to jeopardize its official representation in Kingston by supporting any Jamaican revolutionary group.

3. In February 1966, the Cuban consul reportedly approached a leftist leader to find front men to transport Jamaicans on small boats to Cuban ships, which would then

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take them to Cuba. Velasquez is believed to have offered four scholarships to Jamaicans for study at a Cuban university. He was also reportedly behind a study conducted by a Jamaican extremist which concluded that the time was approaching when a Jamaican revolution would be feasible and could be carried out successfully.

4. In late 1966, Curtis Johnston, the first Jamaican to undergo several years of training in Cuba, returned to Jamaica. His further effectiveness is in doubt, however, because of reports that he has become disenchanted with Cuba.

5. In addition to the Cuban Consulate's dealings with Jamaican extremists, there is considerable evidence that it is being used as a "staging post" to assist subversive movements in other Latin American countries.

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Cuban Subversive Activities in Honduras 1959 - 1967

1. Prior to the break in Cuban-Honduran diplomatic relations in April 1961, Cubans under diplomatic immunity engaged in proselytizing in the north coast region of Honduras. After Honduras broke relations, it became the target of a vicious regular radio program beamed from Havana.
2. During 1962 and 1963, there were scattered reports of exiled Nicaraguan guerrilla groups based in the thinly patrolled Honduran frontier areas. These groups reportedly received support from Cuba and raided sporadically into Nicaragua. One group, under the leadership of Carlos Fonseca Amador, had an estimated 40 men.
3. During 1963, a large amount of Cuban propaganda was sent to Honduras through the regular mails. There were unconfirmed reports that arms were being smuggled into Honduras from Cuba and that Cuban agents were landed in June and July.
4. In late 1964, Cuba set up a revolutionary group called the Liberation Movement of Francisco Morazan (MLFM), made up of Hondurans who had received guerrilla warfare

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training in Cuba. The group made an abortive attack on the Rio Lindo hydroelectric plant in March 1966 but has since been inactive.

5. This lack of activity is due to two factors. One is Havana's assessment that the MLFM possessed no comprehensive revolutionary program. The other is that the Communist Party of Honduras (PCH) is split into two antagonistic factions, the San Pedro Sula Committee, the "Hard line faction" composed of young militants, and the Tegucigalpa Committee made up of "orthodox" Marxists who contend that conditions are not ripe for direct activity.

6. Actually, important elements of both factions doubt that a policy of armed struggle would be effective. The conflict is not so much ideological as it is personal. Power is the underlying issue.

7. Past failures, a lack of Cuban enthusiasm, and organizational difficulties discourage a Castro-type insurgency in Honduras. However, should political instability develop it is likely that the MLFM would resume operations.

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Cuban Subversive Activities in Brazil 1959 - 1967

1. During the years 1960 - 1962, the Castro regime developed close ties with Francisco Juliao, the self-proclaimed Communist and leader of the Peasant Leagues in northeast Brazil. Juliao, whose wife and children reside in Cuba, has traveled there on several occasions, and a number of his associates and rank-and-file members of the Leagues have gone to Cuba for agricultural training which was undoubtedly heavily larded with ideological indoctrination. Transportation direct from northeast Brazil to Cuba was provided by Cubana airlines on at least one occasion. Circumstantial evidence strongly suggests that Juliao had received financial assistance for his movement from the Cuban Government. Brazilian Communist leaders privately stated, in fact, that Juliao's Peasant Leagues received not only money but also shipments of small arms from Cuba. These Brazilian Communists also said that the reason Julio sent his family to Cuba was that he feared they might be endangered in the civil war he expected to erupt at any moment in Brazil.

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2. The Cuban Government also during 1962 cultivated close relations with leaders of the dissident Communist Party of Brazil (CPB). [REDACTED] 25X1X
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which Castro expressed identity of feeling with the dissident Brazilian Communists and criticized the regular Communist Party for its failure "to take a strong revolutionary line" in accordance with the decision of the 22nd party congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Castro approved the insurrectionary policy of the CPB and urged the leaders to organize guerrilla activities and start the revolutionary movement in Brazil "as soon as possible." Castro advised them that government reprisals against revolutionary action in Brazil would only increase popular discontent and swell the ranks of the revolutionaries. He advised CPB leaders to give special emphasis to securing as wide a base as possible among agricultural workers and the inhabitants of rural areas.

3. The Cuban embassy in Rio de Janeiro was a source of assistance to Communist and pro-Communist elements during this period. In May 1962, leaks to the Brazilian press

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reported discussions in the Brazilian cabinet on the subversive activities being directed by Cuban Ambassador Joaquin Hernandez Armas. The Navy and Army Ministers later expressed particular concern over Hernandez' activities.

4. In December 1962, Cuban funds and propaganda for Juliao's Peasant Leagues were disrupted when Brazilian authorities discovered several guerrilla training centers at the same time as dissension erupted in the movement. In early 1963, the Cuban Embassy stood ready to aid the major dissident element, while Juliao began selling personal possessions to raise funds. By the end of June, however, Juliao claimed to have the support of Cuban Ambassador Raul Roa Kouri, the son of Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa, who had arrived in Brazil on 3 June. According to reports, Roa resumed funding Juliao and attempted to bring elements of the dissident CPB into Juliao's orbit.

5. During 1963 the Cubans also expended considerable effort and funds on activities designed to emphasize to Brazilians the achievements of the Cuban revolution. This was the purpose in sending a delegation of 115 by chartered

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plane to the Fourth Pan American games in Sao Paulo, held from 20 April to 5 May. Three Cuban representatives also attended the Latin American Educators' Conference in Rio, where they extolled the accomplishments of education in Cuba. Over 100 Brazilian architects were invited to the International Union of Architects Congress in Havana in the fall, and Cuban President Dorticos invited Brazilian President Goulart to visit Cuba.

6. In the fall of 1963 Ambassador Rea appeared to be changing his mind about supporting Juliao and began to favor Leonel Brizola, President Goulart's violently anti-American brother-in-law. In late February 1964, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Brizola had agreed to accept offers of Cuban financial assistance for his expanding press and radio activities and to "buy some arms" for his Popular Mobilization Front. [REDACTED] the first funds

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for arms reached Brizola on 5 March 1964, in Bolivian, Venezuelan, and Uruguayan currencies. In addition, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] about 10 days before Goulart's ouster, Havana sent money to Brazil in an effort to bolster Brizola's "Group of 11". Four Cuban couriers reportedly took the money to Brazil via Mexico City.

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7. Brazil before Goulart's overthrow afforded Cuba an excellent base for promoting hemisphere-wide, pro-Cuban front groups. It was also the center of a substantial propaganda operation and was used as a transit area for some Latin American subversives returning to their countries after having received training in Cuba.

8. The revolution of 30 March - 1 April 1964, and the severance of relations with Cuba in May, deprived Havana of this important base and forced many of the Cuban assets such as Brizola to go into exile or to jail.

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9. During the balance of 1964 and 1965, scattered [redacted] reports claimed continued but limited contacts between Brizola emissaries and Cuban agents based in Europe. Havana Radio stepped up its propaganda urging "all nationalists of the left" to take up the struggle against the Brazilian Government. However, no reports were received between April 1965 and April 1966 indicating that Havana was continuing to fund struggle groups.

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10. Recent reporting indicates that Havana may have told Brazila, who has remained in Uruguay to begin guerrilla operations or lose his already minimal Cuban financing. It is doubtful, however, that Castro really counts on Brizola or any other Brazilian to begin an anti-government campaign soon.

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Cuban Subversive Activities in Argentina 1959 - 1967

1. In April 1962, the Argentine community in Cuba organized the Cuban-Argentine Friendship Institute. One of its leaders was John William Cooke, their exiled former chief of ex-dictator Juan Peron's political machine in Argentina. Cooke was and is, still active in that faction of the Peronista Party, now quite small, which seeks concerted action with the Communist Party of Argentina. This faction is generally rejected by the great majority of Peronista movement. In 1962, Cooke maintained regular contact with sympathizers inside and outside of Argentina through travelers and through his wife, Alicia Eguren de Cooke, a resident of Montevideo, who apparently had regular means of communication with individuals in Argentina. He and his wife recruited Argentine citizens to go to Cuba for training. There are also strong indications that they encouraged and perhaps assisted terrorist activities carried out in the past by Argentine Peronists and Communists.

2. Prior to the diplomatic break between Argentina and Cuba in February 1962, the Cuban embassy in Buenos Aires provided financial assistance to anti-government groups there.

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[REDACTED] the Communist
Party (PCA) [REDACTED] had received
50,000 pesos from the Cuban embassy as a contribution to the
railway workers who were then on strike in Cordoba Province.

3. Following the severing of diplomatic relations,
Cuban clandestine assistance to Argentine Peronist-Communist
groups continued. On 19 July 1962, the federal police in
Buenos Aires reported unearthing a center of Communist and
Peronist activities in the capital. Two Buenos Aires
policemen had been shot and killed at a suburban warehouse
the previous month. Investigations revealed a quantity of
explosives and propaganda stored in the warehouse. The trail
led to the arrest of Jose Maria Aponte, a journalist and
known Peronist activist, and Mario Massi, owner of the firm
that owned the warehouse. It was later revealed that Massi
had been maintaining contact with Cuban Communists, with
John William Cooke, and with an unidentified woman associated
with the Cuban embassy in Uruguay who was probably Alicia
Eiguren de Cooke. According to the Argentine police investi-
gation, at least 100 Argentine citizens had been sent from
Argentina to Cuba (through Uruguay and Mexico) for training

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in guerrilla warfare between 1959 and 1962. On their return to Argentina, these men were to be used in planned activities in Formosa, Tucuman, Salta, and other Argentine Provinces. They and a number of other individuals were apprehended by the Argentine police in connection with the subversive activity revealed in these investigations.

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4. In mid-January 1963 Fidel Castro told [redacted]

[redacted] that Argentina was the second objective (after Venezuela) in his revolutionary plan for Latin America. Cuban leaders were making an all-out effort to win the cooperation of Juan Peron, who was then residing in Madrid. In April Peron told [redacted] that the Cubans had given the Peronists \$750,000, presumably as a token of Castro's support. Subsequently, contacts between Cuban officials close to Castro and Peronist agents increased. Two such officials who had accompanied Castro on his visit to Moscow in April and May reportedly met with Antonio in Madrid after the Moscow visit.

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5. On 22 June 1963, John William Cooke arrived clandestinely in Buenos Aires from Uruguay and met with representatives of the "hard-line" (Leftist) Peronists,

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He offered financial aid to help them launch a "vote in blank" movement designed to sabotage the Argentine elections of 7 July. At about the same time, Cooke's wife arrived in Santiago, Chile, where she presided over a secret Communist meeting to coordinate plans for the Argentine elections. In the meantime, Hector Villalon, an Argentine involved in commercial transactions for the Cuban Government and an agent of Peron in contact with various governments, had arrived in Montevideo with large sums of money which he was to use to support the hard-line Peronists and buy or influence as many Peronist leaders as possible. The revelation of these schemes prompted the Argentine Government to issue a decree restricting Communist activities in Argentina.

5. In January 1964, Julio Gallego, a left-wing Peronist, and Cuban contact traveled to the provinces of Jujuy and Salta near the Bolivian border presumably to visit the pro-Castro guerrilla camps discovered by Argentine police in March. Some guerrillas who were arrested in that raid are known to have had guerrilla warfare training in Cuba. Among the propaganda items found at these camps was a book written by Jorge Ricardo Masetti, a protege of "Che" Guevara, who

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was in Cuba in 1963 as a director of Prensa Latina. He is thought to be the "Commandante Segundo" who was in charge of the small guerrilla bands discovered in northern Argentina in March and April.

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7. Following the Havana meeting of Latin American Communists in November 1964, at which Cuba agreed to support only pro-Moscow Communist parties in Latin America, the Cubans largely ended their financial support of Villalon, Cooke, and other aspirant revolutionaries. [redacted] 25

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[redacted] quoted Cooke to the effect that Cuban support for Argentine subversive movements would henceforth be channeled through the PCA -- in accordance with the agreement reached at the Havana meeting. In July 1963, it was reported that the left-wing Peronist revolutionary faction was turning increasingly toward Communist China rather than Cuba for advice, financial support, and training.

Since 1965, Cuban aid to would-be revolutionaries

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in Argentina has been channeled exclusively through the PCA, which is now illegal and operates clandestinely. Within the pro-Soviet PCA, Castroism has fallen into disfavor. On the other hand, younger activists support the Castro theory of guerrilla warfare, as well as the Maoist revolutionary line. In Argentina's middle-class society, however, there is little basis for starting or sustaining a guerrilla campaign, so the extremists' activities must remain theoretical or concerned with other countries. About 150 youths have received training in Cuba in recent years, but they have made no apparent effort to put what they have learned into practice.

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Cuban Subversive Activities in El Salvador 1959 - 1967

1. On 1 March 1961, the Salvadoran Government broke diplomatic relations with the Castro regime after it received evidence of conversations between Cuban charge Roberto Lassale, and leading Salvadoran Communists in which Lassale urged increased revolutionary activity. Further controls were imposed on subversives in September 1962, when the Salvadoran Government began arresting persons who had traveled to Cuba. Accordingly there was a sharp drop in interest on the part of students and others in making trips to Cuba.

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2. During 1963 there was little evidence of direct Cuban-supported subversion in El Salvador.

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3. Since 1964, there has been very little evidence of any other Cuban involvement in the country. One attempt may have been made during 1965 to reactivate some revolutionaries who had received training in Cuba but nothing further has been heard of their activities.

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Cuban Subversive Activities in Haiti 1959 - 1967

1. On 13 August 1959, a small revolutionary expedition landed in Haiti from Cuba. This group was completely liquidated by the Haitian military and the foray prompted the severing of diplomatic relations between the two countries on 29 August. Many Haitian Communists fled to Cuba and gathered under the leadership of Rene Deprestre. Many thousands of Haitian citizens employed as sugar cane workers in eastern Cuba were then subjected to Castroist indoctrination.

2. Cuba's subversive efforts directed against the Duvalier regime today are confined largely to guerrilla training and propaganda broadcasts.

3. A group of Haitians is receiving guerrilla training in Cuba through the Union of Haitians Resident in Cuba (UHRC). UHRC cooperates with the external organization of the Unified Democratic Front for the National Liberation of Haiti (FDNLN), a new Haitian Communist front. Reportedly, these revolutionaries

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are to be infiltrated into Haiti via the Dominican Republic when the time is "ripe". It has been reliably reported recently that 14 Party of Popular Accord (PPD) members, probably trained in Cuba, were sent by the Cuban government to the Dominican Republic to train Haitians in that country.

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Cuban Subversive Activities in Chile 1959 - 1967

1. During the years 1960-1962, the Cuban embassy in Santiago was the source of propaganda support for pro-Communist groups associated with Salvador Allende, a Socialist and leading presidential aspirant.

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a visit to the area by a Cuban diplomat in July, pro-Castro propaganda was being distributed in the area. Communists and pro-Communists in the area were reportedly saying, "the mountains of Salamanca are going to be the Chilean Sierra Maestra."

2. During 1962-1963 the Cuban Commercial Office in Santiago and the local Prensa Latina office functioned as mechanisms to pass funds to Allende and his campaign for the presidency. Allende's campaign manager, Salomon Corbalan,

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also made several trips to Cuba to obtain funds and instructions.

3. On the other hand, relations between the Communist Party of Chile (PCCh) and the Cuban Government were not close during this period. The PCCh was committed to its policy of "via Pacifica" and firmly rejected Castro's calls for violent revolution in Latin America. Cuba repeatedly offered guerrilla training to the PCCh, but was rejected each time. As a result the Cubans attempted to work with the more militant Socialist Party and reportedly were successful in attracting some trainees.

4. In 1964, Cuban efforts were heavily concentrated on Allende's presidential campaign. After Allende visited Cuba in January, the usually reserved Che Guevara said, "Watch Chile, it will be the next Latin American country to enter our camp." Cuban hopes and exertions were severely disrupted in August when Chile complied with the OAS resolution and broke diplomatic relations with Havana. This misfortune was compounded by Eduardo Frei's smashing victory over Allende at the polls in September.

5. Chilean-Cuban relations could best be described as "restrained" during 1965 and early 1966. On 13 March 1966, however, Castro condemned the Frei government for the first

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time--thus stirring anti-Cuban feelings in Chile. Castro said Frei was bringing, "bloodshed without revolution" to Chile rather than the claimed "bloodless revolution," and that "armed struggle" will be the only way to bring real revolution to Chile. He repeated these accusations in July and some Chilean Communists who were present cut short their visit to Cuba.

6. Recently there have been reports that the PCCh is trying to repair its relations with Castro. The PCCh was able to thwart the Socialist desire to include extremists in the Chilean LASO committee, and the party may use the July LASO meeting to discuss its differences with Castro.

7. At the present time Cuban subversive activities are practically non-existent in Chile. Relations between the two countries are very bad, and even left-wing Chileans have criticized Castro's techniques.

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Cuban Subversive Activities in Costa Rica 1959 - 1967

1. As early as 1960, the Cuban Government asked the Popular Vanguard Party (PVP), the small Costa Rican Communist party, to select young men to be trained in Cuba. Two leading PVP leaders, Rigoberto Carmona and Jose Murillo, went to Cuba in June 1962 for guerrilla training. These men were to set up guerrilla schools in Costa Rica on their return. At the same time, Fernando Chavez Molina, a veteran Communist, was named to urge the central committee of the PVP to emulate the Cuban revolution.

2. During 1963, Cuban trained guerrillas were reported to be operating in various sections of the country. These guerrilla fighters were used by the PVP to counter opposition to its May Day celebration in 1963 and reportedly pleased the party's hierarchy with their rock-throwing ability when a riot erupted. During this year the Costa Rican Society for Friendship with the Peoples, a Communist-front group, became active and propagandized on behalf of trying to copy the Cuban revolution.

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3. In 1964, most of the pro-Castro activity in Costa Rica appeared to be directed against neighboring Nicaragua as Cuban-trained revolutionaries ventured across the border to stir up trouble. In addition, the police inspector at a town in the Pacific banana zone reported in early February that two unidentified Cubans who traveled from Panama to Costa Rica attempted to stir up banana workers in support of Panamanian charges against the US following the anti-US canal riots.

4. Since 1964, no reliable reports have been received of Cuban subversive activities against the Costa Rican Government. PVP leaders attend all the many celebrations and conferences held in Havana, but faithfully adhere to political action rather than armed revolutionary tactics.

5. Relations between the PVP and Cuban Communist Party have become increasingly strained because of Cuba's alleged interference with PVP affairs, particularly its urging the Costa Ricans to turn to armed revolution.

6. In fact, small groups within the PVP have been talking in favor of armed revolution. Their influence plus

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that of Radio Havana has begun to affect the thinking of others in the party. In the last few months some PVP members have advocated bringing Cuban experts in guerrilla warfare to Costa Rica to train party members.

7. Some 40 Costa Ricans have been trained in guerrilla warfare in Cuba and some of these have in turn trained small groups in Costa Rica.

8. The leading pro-Castro Communist in Costa Rica is Macial Aguiluz, president of the Communist-front Socialist Action Party (PAS).

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Cuban Subversive Activities in Mexico 1959 - 1967

1. Since 1959, the Cuban embassy in Mexico City, three consulates (in Merida, Tampico, and Vera Cruz) have engaged in propaganda activities designed to encourage the pro-Communist cause in Mexico. The Cuban ambassador to Mexico in 1962 was reported to have concluded an agreement with leaders of the newly formed extremist group, the National Liberation Movement (MLN), in which some of the money sent by Havana for embassy expenses was earmarked as a contribution to the MLN. Mexican officials were disturbed at the participation of Cuban embassy officials in inciting anti-US demonstrations by students in July and August 1960. They were also angered at the large amount of Cuban propaganda coming into the country.

2. Cuban subversive activities in Mexico have been support and liaison actions directed at other countries, mainly Central American. The Castro regime has avoided revolutionary activity directed against Mexico, which provides a commercial, travel, and diplomatic outlet as well as an outpost for subversion of Latin America.

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Cuba continues to use its Embassy in Mexico as a funding and communications center for Central American Communists, and Cuban involvement in arms trafficking in Mexico has been frequently reported but not proved. In September 1968, however, an official of the Cuban Embassy was arrested and deported for involvement in the smuggling of arms to Guatemala. A month earlier, Communist journalist Victor Rico Galan, [REDACTED] was arrested for conspiracy apparently unconnected with Cuba.

3. Both the Mexican Communist Party and the Popular Socialist Party have been antagonized by the Cubans' continued preference for the nearly defunct National Liberation Movement in Mexico, but they have not refrained from sending delegates to conferences and other gatherings in Cuba even when Cuba has relegated them to secondary roles.

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Cuban Subversive Activities in Panama 1959 - 1967

1. On 25 April 1959 an 87-man invasion force from Cuba landed in Panama. This group was subsequently rounded up by Panamanian security forces, jailed in Panama City, and returned unharmed to Cuba.
2. Following this fiasco, known Cuban support for Panamanian insurgents consisted almost entirely of guerrilla training in Cuba. Unconfirmed reports suggested Cuban support for the attempted revolt led by former Guardia Nacional Major Manuel Hurtado in August 1962. Cubans were also linked to instances of sabotage at the Chiriqui Land Company in Chiriqui Province, which took place after January 1963.
3. Most of the Cuban support, until late 1964, focused on the Vanguard of National Action (VAN), about 60 of whose members had by then received guerrilla training or political indoctrination in Cuba. When VAN began to lose popular support because of leadership difficulties, the hard-line revolutionary movement in Panama passed to the Movement of Revolutionary Unity (MUR), an organization of university students. Many members

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of the MUR had also received guerrilla training in Cuba. Havana reportedly advised its Panamanian supporters in July 1964 to establish the MUR because of the soft-line posture of the pro-Moscow Panamanian Communist Party (PdP).

4. By 1966, largely because of leadership rivalries, the MUR had split into three small pro-Chinese and pro-Cuban factions. Floyd Britton, one of the MUR founders, kept the name and the majority of the members and has adopted a pro-Cuba line. While Havana apparently has been willing to provide guerrilla training for these revolutionaries, it is unwilling to give them more than limited funds until they show that they are united and following a plan of operations with defined objectives.

5. The Moscow-oriented PdP has about 500 members, but only 50 are active. After the rioting in Colon in June 1966, the Panamanian Government arrested many PdP members and leaders with the result that some are in jail, some in hiding, and some are out of the country. About 80 members of the party were trained in Cuba and 75 in bloc countries. Seventy others are suspected of having received some training.

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6. Extremist elements of Panama's largest political
party, the Panamenista Party (PP), from time to time have
sought support from Castro to overthrow the Panamanian government.
So far, Havana has refused to do more than string
the PP along, and the indications are that Castro does not
trust PP leader Arnulfo Arias.

7. About 150 Panamanians, most of them students, have
received training in party leadership or guerrilla warfare
in the USSR, Cuba, or Communist China. During 1966 about
15 Panamanians went to Cuba for guerrilla training alone.
These revolutionaries can be expected to be in the forefront
of future disorders.

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d. [REDACTED] both hard and
soft line Communist leaders expect to benefit if President
Robles attempts to achieve ratification of a canal treaty.
They hope that opposition to the treaty will touch off
massive demonstrations which they can exploit.

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Cuban Subversive Activities in Paraguay 1959 - 1967

1. After Paraguay severed diplomatic relations with Cuba on 5 December 1960, Paraguayan exiles in Uruguay and Brazil began to receive Cuban financial assistance. Four members of the United Front for National Liberation (FULNA), a Paraguayan Communist exile group in Uruguay, now defunct, reportedly received \$230 monthly in 1962 from the Cuban embassy in Montevideo to finance pro-Castro activities.

2. In February 1964, reports indicated that Paraguayan exiles in Argentina, and Brazil had received \$30,000 from Cuban representatives in Montevideo to support their attempts to overthrow the Stroessner regime. Meanwhile, Cuba reportedly also financed the purchase of weapons and ammunition that were cached in Argentina and Brazil by the Paraguayan Communist Party (PCP), using members who had been trained in Cuba.

3. The PCP now claims that over 200 men have received some instruction in guerrilla warfare--about half in Cuba and the rest at training bases in Argentina and Brazil,

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given by those who had returned from Cuba. In addition, a few members of the Febrerista and Liberal Party youth groups in exile have been sent to Cuba for training in guerrilla tactics. Some of those trained have reportedly returned to Paraguay but the majority have remained in exile to train guerrillas.

4. Despite elaborate plans, the Paraguayan insurgent movement has, thus far, been a failure. The exile guerrilla camps in Argentina and Brazil have been subject to constant harassment by the authorities. The break in diplomatic relations between Uruguay and Cuba in August 1964 deprived Havana of an important base from which to support the anti-Stroessner exiles. Moreover, the guerrilla leaders themselves have proved ineffectual in mounting operations against the efficient security forces of the Stroessner regime.

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Cuban Subversive Activities in Nicaragua 1959 - 1967

1. Following the break in Nicaragua-Cuba relations on 1 June 1960, a cadre of Nicaraguan Communists-in-exile was based in Cuba. Some of these Nicaraguans were trained in guerrilla warfare and were later infiltrated into Nicaragua across the Honduran border.

2. Eight Nicaraguans were tried in June 1962, for conducting terrorist training. They were caught while attending a course in bomb making taught by a Cuba-trained instructor. Nicaraguan authorities also seized arms, ammunition, explosives, and 700 pounds of propaganda. A Nicaraguan found with an arms cache earlier that year reportedly told interrogators that the arms had come from Cuba. In the fall, another Nicaraguan, who had gone to Cuba in mid-1962, ostensibly for a surgical operation, was caught with supplies of explosives intended for terrorist bombings.

3. In January 1963, Cuban support to Nicaraguan insurgent groups was directed to the newly created National Liberation Front (FLN). The amount of money sent from Cuba to this group in 1963 cannot accurately be assessed, but

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at least \$10,000 found its way into FLM coffers. Some reports also indicate that arms and supplies had been smuggled to the group's principal training camp on the Rio Patuca.


4. In August 1963, the FLM launched an unsuccessful guerrilla foray into northern Nicaragua from Honduras, which cost the small organization some of its key personnel. Following this disaster, the FLM appeared to be moribund.

5. Since 1963, the FLM's successor organization, the National Sandinist Liberation Front (FSLN), has been the object of constant harassment by both Nicaraguan and Honduran security forces. Consequently, the FSLN has shown no capability to launch a successful anti-government action, but it was involved in the pre-election rioting in January 1967. The FSLN is now reportedly obtaining arms, and may be expected to take advantage of future disorders.

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Cuban Subversive Activities in Guatemala 1959 - 1967

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2. During the spring of 1963, no significant funds appear to have reached this group by way of Mexico. Many of its

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leaders were in contact, however, with Cuban agents in Mexico and some propaganda material was circulated. Yon Sosa, the leader of the Movement, reportedly visited Cuba in late 1962 and early 1963 and received \$200,000 in funds, as well as guidance and communications equipment. In June 1963 a cache of arms and documents was seized in Guatemala City. In October, one of the persons killed by the premature explosion of a home-made bomb was acknowledged by the Guatemalan Communist Party as a Cuban-trained expert in explosives. Mexican Marxist journalist Victor Rico Galan,

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[redacted] saw Yon Sosa in October 1963, and reportedly urged him to head his feud with the orthodox Communists.

3. Yon refused, and on 15 January 1966 Castro publicly chastized him for following "the wrong revolutionary path" and for being a "tool of the Trotskyists."

4. In line with the agreement reached at the November 1964 meeting in Havana of Latin American Communists, and as a result of Yon's failure to come to terms with the Communist Party, Cuba began to channel its aid exclusively to the

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fighting arm of the party, the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR). This aid was provided through the Cuban embassy in Mexico and apparently still is. The embassy Third-Secretary was arrested in Mexico last fall in connection with clandestine arms smuggling with the FAR.

5. In October 1966, FAR leader Luis Turcios was killed in an automobile accident and Julio Cesar Macias Mayora, alias Cesar Montes, a member of the PGT central committee, was named as his replacement. Turcios' removal from the scene does not seem to have brought the unification of the guerrilla movement much nearer, though Yon Sosa made a gesture in this direction by announcing that he had broken with the Fourth International and expelled three Trotskyists from his group.

6. Both guerrilla groups have been weakened by army and right-wing vigilante operations against them. Despite these acts, however, they are still capable of harassing the government; the FAR, at least, can count on continued Cuban training and financial assistance.

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Cuban Subversive Activities in Ecuador 1959 - 1967

1. By 1962, the Communist Party of Ecuador had formed the nucleus of a small guerrilla organization. This group was drawn largely from the pro-Castro Revolutionary Union of Ecuadorean Youth (URJE), which was involved in a two-day battle with government forces in April 1962. The leader in this affair, as well as several other Ecuadoreans involved in subversive activities, had received guerrilla training in Cuba. [REDACTED]

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25X1X [REDACTED] had received \$22,000 from the Cuban Government so far that year. Manuel Araujo Midalgo, a pro-Communist former Ecuadorean Minister of the Interior who visited both Cuba and Communist China, reportedly worked with the URJE and may have been paid by the Cuban Government for his efforts.

2. On 16 December 1962, Juan Adatti Salto, a member of the Communist Youth of Ecuador (JCE) and the URJE, said that there were 80 members of the JCE and URJE in Cuba studying guerrilla warfare. They were to return in 1963 in order to train other guerrillas in Ecuador.

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3. In the spring of 1963 these guerrilla trainees did begin to return. One trainee returned from Cuba by way of Santiago where he picked up \$30,000 from the Cuban embassy for promoting guerrilla activity in Ecuador. On 22 April 1963, the Ecuadorean police arrested and deported to Cuba Julia de Cordova, a Cuban agitator who had been living in Ecuador under an assumed name for more than a year. Also in April, a Cuban-trained revolutionist lost his arm when a home-made bomb exploded in his hand during a training exercise.

4. Following the military coup on 11 July 1963, the Ecuadorean Government's careful monitoring of anti-government activities severely hampered Cuban efforts. Clandestine reports continued to indicate, however, that Rafael Echevarria, the leader of the hard-line faction of the Ecuadorean Communist Party, was in contact with Castro and was readying guerrilla operations. Other sources reported that Cuban aid had been offered to followers of former presidents Velasco Ibarra and Arosemena in order to eliminate the military junta.

5. Under the interim governments of Yerovi and Arosemena since April 1966, restrictions on Communists have

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eased considerably. Cuban activities, however, continue to be limited and of little demonstrable importance. The perpetual disorganization, lack of cohesiveness, and poor quality of leadership among the various Ecuadorean terrorist and revolutionary groups have probably led the Cubans to conclude that revolutionary prospects are slight at best in Ecuador.

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Cuban Subversive Activities in Bolivia 1959 - 1967

1. Bolivia has long been the recipient of special Cuban attentions. Blatant intervention in Bolivian affairs, including conspiracy with the Bolivian Communist Party and attempts to split the government, by Cuban ambassador Tabares in 1960 and Charge Garcia Triana in 1961 obliged the Bolivian Government to expel them. In June 1961, the Bolivian Government published a series of documents linking the Cuban embassy with a Communist conspiracy to seize control of the government. One of these documents, a statement by an arrested Bolivian agitator who had been in close contact with the Cuban embassy, gave the names of a number of Bolivians who had received financial support from the embassy. This evidence was later used to justify the request for the Cuban charge's recall.

2. Garcia Triana's successor, Ramon Aja, was also active but a bit more discreet. He was particularly energetic in cultivating relations with Bolivian campesinos and reportedly gave Cuban financial assistance to the peasant union in the Cliza Valley area. He, along with another

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embassy officer, was also instrumental in providing financial support for the development of a pro-Communist, pro-Castro Youth youth group -- the Bolivian Democratic/(ESPARTACO) -- which was organized in La Paz in May 1963. In November of that year, members of this group were caught, attempting to plant bombs near the homes of Rene Barrientos and the US Ambassador. During 1963 many Bolivian students, campesinos, and union members traveled to Cuba. These individuals undoubtedly received some instruction and training, and several brought large quantities of Cuban propaganda into the country.

3. During 1963 and early 1964 Cuban subversive activity in Bolivia centered on attempts to strengthen pro-Castro sentiment among the followers of extremist Vice President Juan Lechin. Through its embassy, Cuba reportedly gave Lechin and his followers some arms and money to aid his struggle against President Paz Estenssoro for political domination of the country. At a meeting in September 1963 with leaders of Lechin's faction of the MNR and other extremist leaders, Cuban Charge Roberto Lassalle said that the Cuban Government believed it necessary to organize well-armed combat cadres from among various leftist-extremist groups. He said that Havana was prepared to supply the required arms.

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4.

[REDACTED] on 7 December 1963,

Lassale gave him two boxes of arms to be distributed among the volatile Bolivian tin miners who at that time were in revolt against his government. On 17 March 1964, Lassale told an emissary of Lechin that the Cuban Government was willing to provide financial and material support to Lechin for his campaign to unseat President Paz in the 31 May presidential elections. Lechin was scheduled to meet with Cuban agents in early April to discuss his financial needs and to determine what he was prepared to offer in return for the proposed Cuban assistance.

5. On 21 August 1964, the Bolivian Government ended Cuban subversive activities by severing diplomatic relations with Havana. Cuba's active support for Bolivian extremist groups deteriorated steadily and, during 1965, appeared to be non-existent.

6. Following the January 1966 Tri-Continent Conference, however, Havana again began training a number of Bolivians in guerrilla warfare. There is firm evidence that some members of the guerrilla band that has been active in

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southeastern Bolivia since March 1967 are drawn from this trained group as well as from the pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese Communist Parties.

7. Other evidence of direct Cuban involvement in the Bolivian insurgency is strong. [REDACTED] captured guerrillas claim that Cubans have been or are currently present in the guerrilla camps and that radio contact is maintained with Havana. Articles of clothing bearing Cuban markings have been found at abandoned campsites. Furthermore, Rene Roberto Olivares Garcia, a leader of the pro-Soviet Communist Party, told selected party leaders in September 1966 that the PCB/S would establish a guerrilla capability which would be operating within a year. Olivares revealed that he had received guerrilla warfare training in Cuba in January 1966, and that he had begun teaching guerrilla warfare classes in Bolivia in September. In November 1966, Mario Monje Molina, First Secretary of the PCB/S, and Roberto Peredo went to Havana to discuss guerrilla plans with Cuban leaders. Later in the month, Cuba began training Bolivians in guerrilla warfare techniques.

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3. In January 1967, guerrilla warfare experts went into the Alto Beni, northeast of La Paz, and the Chapare region northeast of Cochabamba to prepare guerrilla operations to be initiated in February. In mid-February, a guerrilla band was formed in Santa Cruz department, under the leadership of Guido and Roberto Peredo. It was this group which was spurred into premature action when an army patrol discovered its hideout. Jules Regis Debray, the French Communist intellectual and Fidel Castro's revolutionary apostle, was also a member of this group until his recent capture by the Bolivian military. Debray was reportedly acting as a guerrilla group coordinator and as a liaison with European leftists.

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Cuban Subversive Activities in Colombia 1959 - 1967

1. Soon after Castro came to power in 1959, he began trying to exploit the bloody ten-year struggle for power between Liberals and Conservatives in Colombia. His support for the insurgent groups that had developed during that struggle prompted Bogota to condemn Cuba in the OAS in August 1960 and to sever diplomatic relations on 9 December 1961.

2. In early 1962 Cuba was detected giving financial assistance to the United Front for Revolutionary Action (FUAR), an indigenous Colombian group which was to promote guerrilla warfare. [REDACTED] Castro

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gave the group \$15,000 in June 1962 and promised further aid semi-annually. Gloria Gaitan de Valencia, the wife of a FUAR leader and the daughter of Jorge Eliecer Gaitan whose assassination in 1948 sparked the disastrous Bogota rioting, is a long-time friend of Fidel Castro. She visited Cuba from 1959 to 1962 and probably brought back advice and assistance from the Cuban Government. By late 1962, the FUAR

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had picked up a good many members from the extremist wing of the Colombian Communist Party which was dissatisfied with the party's reluctance to engage in open revolutionary action. By mid-1963 the FUAR, under the leadership of Alfonso Romero Buj, was in contact with other guerrilla leaders in an effort to enlist their support.

3. Cuban funds also went to the Worker-Student-Peasant Movement (MOPC) which was incorporated into the FUAR in the spring of 1962. Prior to that funding reportedly took place through the Cuban embassy in Bogota. Eduardo Aristizabal had several months training in Cuba late in 1962.

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3. During the fall of 1963 and the spring of 1964 the FUAR began to build and activate an organization known as the National Liberation Front (FLN). This organization began to be the main recipient of Cuban aid. Late in 1963, two Cubans were reported to have visited Colombia in order to evaluate the FLN and its prospects and to pass funds for further activity. However, in 1965, the FUAR, unable to make any progress, dissolved itself.

6. In 1964, Cuba provided a new group, the Army of National Liberation (ELN), with \$25,000 and trained a number of its members in guerrilla warfare tactics. This group's attack on the town of Simacota in Santander Department in 1965 brought hemispheric-wide attention to the insurgent problem in Colombia.

7. In 1966, several other guerrilla groups more or less allied with the Communist Party of Colombia set up a unified command under the name Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC), which has been strongly supported by Cuban propaganda.

8. During the first half of 1967 there have been six

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major guerrilla incidents, including an ELM attack on a police post in which five policemen were killed, and a FARC ambush of an army patrol in which fifteen soldiers were killed. Numerous small-scale incidents have also taken place. Despite strong Cuban propaganda support and training of ELM and FARC guerrillas, no evidence has been uncovered of Cuban financial or arms aid since the increase in guerrilla activity began this year.

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Cuban Subversive Activities in Peru 1959 - 1967

1. Following the break in diplomatic relations with Peru on 29 December 1960, the Cubans began to expend a good deal of time, money, and material on training and supporting Peruvian revolutionaries. After receiving training in Cuba, the Peruvians returned clandestinely to Peru through Ecuador and Bolivia where extensive support operations were located. They made several attempts to mount a large-scale guerrilla war, operating from the jungles near the Bolivian border, but succeeded only in arousing relatively minor campesino uprisings. Peruvian police broke up one such operation in March 1962 and discovered that among those arrested, one was a former resident of Cuba, another had received clandestine activity training in Cuba, and a third, caught with radio equipment, had used it for communicating with Cuba.

2. In late March 1963, Armando Alcides Rivas Paredes, a Peruvian, was arrested by Bolivian authorities in Cochabamba, Bolivia, as a Cuban agent. His assignment was to introduce Communist propaganda into Peru, through Puerto Heath--an

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isolated border town--

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[REDACTED] On 14 May, Peruvian police clashed with a band of guerrillas who were attempting to re-enter Bolivia at Puerto Maldonado. One of the guerrilla casualties had been trained in Cuba.

3. Information in 1963 indicated that the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) had become the primary vehicle for Cuban-sponsored subversion. Luis de la Puente Uceda, the MIR Secretary-General, reportedly visited Cuba in 1963 and was promised financial and material support.

4. By 1964, the Cubans were sending approximately \$7,000 monthly to the Revolutionary Leftist Front (FIR), the Peruvian Leninist-Communist Party (PCLP), and the Army of National Liberation (ELN). By August 1964, yet another group, the National Liberation Front (FLN), had received a total of \$50,000 to send Peruvians to Cuba for training.

5. In June 1965, the MIR initiated guerrilla insurgency. Fidel Castro promptly declared his support for the MIR, and declared that he was going to add Peru to his list of countries in which he believed prospects for revolutionary success were

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best. By October, however, the Peruvian armed forces had practically destroyed the MIR as an effective fighting force. MIR leaders, including Luis de la Puente, were either dead, in jail, or in exile, and their organization was badly disrupted. Although some efforts are even now being made by guerrilla remnants to reorganize, funding and communications channels have not been restored.

6. Leftist-extremist groups have continued to send members to Cuba for subversive training despite strict controls on such travel. Pro-Castro groups are still active in major Peruvian universities and probably provide a conduit for Cuban penetration of other target groups. Flyers favorable to Cuba were distributed in Lima and Arequipa last year, and student demonstrations have usually included favorable references to the Castro regime.

7. Cuban propaganda media has continued to portray Peru as one of several Latin American countries where the chances for revolutionary success are best. Peru is covered by the international Spanish-language broadcasts of "Radio Havana-Cuba" to South America. A half-hour weekly radio

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program in Quechua--the language of at least two million Indians living in the Peruvian highlands--has been broadcast since May 1965. Prensa Latina, the Cuban news agency, has a stringer in Lima for the transmission of news, although its office was officially closed in April 1961.

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Cuban Subversive Activities in Guyana 1959 - 1967

1. Castro has regularly supported the People's Progressive Party (PPP) and its leader, Cheddi Jagan, even though Jagan has been charged with financial irresponsibility by the Cubans on occasion. Although no Cuban ships have visited Guyana in over a year, when Jagan was Premier (1953-1964) money was taken to Guyana on Cuban ships and given to the PPP when the ships docked in Georgetown. From 1962 through 1964 at least 55 Guyanans received guerrilla training in Cuba, but it is believed that this is only a part of those who actually did so since clandestine boat travel between the two countries was very easy.

2. In March of 1965 Jagan went to Cuba to discuss further support for the PPP and in June he said that he was planning to send a new group of people to Cuba for guerrilla training. Members of the Guyana Liberation Army (GLA), the defunct paramilitary arm of the PPP, who had already returned from Cuba were in turn training other GLA members in Guyana. Most of the GLA weapons were brought from Cuba. However, many arms caches have been discovered

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by the police and as a result the PPP is believed to have few weapons.

25X1X 3. In September of 1965 Janet Jagan, wife of Cheddi Jagan, [REDACTED] she was making arrangements for a nine-month "political science" course to be held in Cuba.

4. Cheddi Jagan went to Cuba through Mexico again in the spring of 1966 to discuss the future activities of the PPP and the GLA, and Cuban support for them. He plans to go to Cuba again in July 1967 as the head of the PPP's LASO delegation.

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Cuban Subversive Activities in Venezuela 1959 - 1967

1. Venezuela has been at the top of Cuba's subversion list, primarily because the FALN, the paramilitary arm of the FLN (National Liberation Front), which is under command of the Communist Party of Venezuela (PCV), has been so active. More than \$1,000,000 was spent in Venezuela between 1960 and 1964 for revolutionary activities, in addition to an unknown amount spent on arms supplied by Cuba. In 1965 the Venezuelan Government intercepted more than \$300,000 destined for the PCV from Cuba.

2. Terrorism was launched in 1961 aimed at overthrowing the government of President Betancourt. FALN terrorists were instructed to attack oil pumping and power stations, highway bridges, and warehouses, as well as urban targets. On 1 November, a three-ton arms cache was found on a beach in northwestern Venezuela. Also found was a launch with an outboard engine, presumably used to transport the weapons from a ship to the beach. Investigations traced the cache and the outboard engine directly to Cuba.

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3. The guerrillas committed themselves to field operations prematurely in 1962. Most were rounded up or dispersed by the armed forces; and 139 were tried for guerrilla activity and sentenced to long prison terms. Interrogation of these prisoners revealed that many of them had had guerrilla training in Cuba.

4. On 25 July 1966, Venezuelan peasants reported the landing on the northeast coast of 40 men who were heavily armed and dressed in green uniforms, and later a launch was found on the beach. Subsequent investigation

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[REDACTED] revealed that they had been in the possession of the Cuban Government in the summer of 1965. This substantiated separate reporting to the effect that the landing did in fact take place and that both money (\$220,000 U.S. dollars) and arms were brought to the dissident, highly militant, faction of the FALN led by Douglas Bravo. Various reports have been received that Teodoro Petkoff, well-known Venezuelan guerrilla leader, returned to Venezuela in the July landing and that he had recently been in Cuba.

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5. In July and August 1966 the orthodox PCV strongly protested Castro's support of the Bravo dissidents and threatened to break relations with Cuba. Castro responded by promising to provide financial support to the orthodox PCV, but stated that he would not cease his support of the Douglas Bravo dissident group.

6. According to unconfirmed reports, seventy armed men landed in an isolated area of the northeastern coast of Venezuela in November 1966. Alfredo Maneiro, guerrilla leader of the FALN, said that the increased combat capabilities and the action of the various armed groups in Venezuela had resulted in part from training received in Vietnam and in part from the receipt of new arms from Cuba by Douglas Bravo's dissident guerrillas. It is possible that Maneiro may be referring to arms brought to Venezuela by the guerrillas who had landed previously.

7. In November 1965, three Cuban-trained Venezuelan guerrilla leaders were arrested in Bogota. Two of the men were MIR members and the other was a PCV member. All of them had been sent to Bogota to support guerrilla activities.

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9. Pedro Duno Garcia, a Moscow-line FALN representative in Europe who returned to Venezuela in late 1966, found that the FALN had begun to recover from the losses suffered at the hands of the government security forces during the past two years. Recent guerrilla and terrorist successes had raised the morale of the extreme leftists and given rise to steps toward reunification of the splintered guerrilla movement in Venezuela. He found, however, that the Cubans were the greatest hindrance to reunification and that relations between the PCV and Cuba were worsening daily. He said that a complete break with the Cubans would be best in the long run in order to keep the Cubans from intervening again in Venezuelan "revolutionary" affairs, although such a break would cause difficulties in the beginning.

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10. The latest guerrilla incident took place on 8 May 1967, when Venezuelan insurgents, escorted by Cuban military personnel, landed near the coastal village of Machurucuto. One of the Cubans drowned when a rubber raft capsized while they were returning to their ship-- possibly a Cuban fishing boat named the "Sierra." Another was shot resisting arrest. Two other Cubans were seized by Venezuelan security forces; and one of these later committed suicide in his prison cell.

11. The Venezuelan guerrillas, who escaped, and the equipment were destined for Americo Martin's MIR group which is operating in the Bachiller Mountains, southeast of Caracas. Martin and one of his lieutenants were captured on 2 June while attempting to leave Venezuela for Europe and probably, eventually, Cuba.

12. Castro is apparently unmoved by this roll-up of some of the Venezuelan insurgents. On 10 May, he virtually admitted responsibility for the landing and said that he had a "moral revolutionary duty" to continue aiding Venezuelan guerrillas.

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CUBAN SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY IN AFRICA

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- I. [REDACTED] Fidel Castro's interest in the revolutionary potential in Africa was first demonstrated in 1961, when Cuba began limited guerrilla warfare training for a few African extremist groups. Today, Cuban efforts in Africa fall into three general categories. Cubans have trained and advised subversive groups operating against existing regimes in Congo (Kinshasa), Rhodesia, Ghana, Cameroon, and Portuguese Africa from neighboring countries. In Congo (Brazzaville), Havana is the main prop of one of the continent's more unstable radical regimes. Elsewhere -- in Tanzania, Guinea, Burundi, Algeria and Mali, for example -- the Cuban relationship with the local authorities is not so close, but there is considerable rapport with revolutionary elements and some mutual benefit from diplomatic exchanges.
- A. At least two explanations can be advanced for Castro's desire to meddle in African affairs. Such activity enhances his credentials as the

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self-proclaimed leader of the anti-imperialist forces of the underdeveloped world, and friendly ties with like-minded regimes in Africa help him avoid the world-wide diplomatic isolation with which Cuba has been threatened in recent years.

B. Castro has clearly decided that he can send Cuban personnel and arms into a number of African countries without running the risks such an operation would involve in Latin America. Moreover, Cuban Negroes can mix inconspicuously with the African population and use their guerrilla training and familiarity with the tropics to good advantage.

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C. [REDACTED] at the present time, Cuba has close to 1,000 military and technical advisors in Africa. Included in this total are 600-700 Cubans engaged in training paramilitary and military groups in Congo (Brazzaville), approximately 30 are training Portuguese Guineans in guerrilla warfare in Guinea, at least 25 Cuban medical and non-military personnel are in Mali, and 70 members of a Cuban medical team are in Algeria.

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Cuban Subversive Activities in Portuguese Africa

June 1967

1. Cuba first began to assist Angolan exiles after Ernesto "Che" Guevara's meeting in early 1965 with Agostinho Neto, head of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), one of the two principal Angolan nationalist groups. Since that time, the MPLA has been operating, with little chance of early success, against Angola and Cabinda and has training camps located in Congo (Brazzaville). [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Neto recently refused a Cuban offer of volunteers on the basis that Angolans must liberate Angola using a few foreigners as possible. Cubans presumably helping to train MPLA cadres in military tactics and are providing other less important aid. Subsequently, there have been rumors, common in such circumstances, that an occasional Cuban has accompanied MPLA fighting units, but such stories are unconfirmed.

2. Recently the Cubans have stepped up their assistance to the African Party for Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), an insurgent movement based in Guiana and

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directed against Portuguese Guinea. The movement now claims to have 5 - 7,000 guerrilla fighters. As many as 700 of them have been trained in one or another of the Communist countries, and they may now occupy as much as a third of the back-country in Portuguese Guinea. Reportedly, there are at least 60 Cubans, led by Major Flavio Bravo, engaged in PAIGC training at the present time. The group has received periodic arms shipments and other supplies landed in Conakry from Cuban ships.

3. The Portuguese are beginning to become apprehensive about the Cuban activities in Portuguese Guinea, partly because Lisbon has been receiving inflated figures of the number of Cubans and rebels involved. Thus far, the rebels have been held to a general stalemate because the Portuguese have been able to maintain a superior force (up to 20,000 troops and some air power). Continuing Cuban support efforts will make it even more difficult for the Portuguese to carry out the costly and tedious operation of clearing the rebels from the interior.

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Cuban Subversive Activities in Rwanda-Burundi June 1967

1. The US Embassy in Bujumbura, Burundi, reported in late November 1966 that it was convinced that Egyptians, Cubans, and Chinese Communists were involved in the chaotic Rwandan exile situation.

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[REDACTED] another leader of the Rwandan Liberation Front, Faustin Oakwaya, traveled to Cuba in mid-July 1966 and returned to Bujumbura in August. Other sources have reported that Cubans and Arabs are backing armed bands of Rwandan exiles which camp on the Burundi side of the border and carry out occasional raids against Rwandan villages.

2. The US Embassy in Bujumbura also reported in December 1966 that Cubans had just appeared on the scene in Burundi, but their efforts had not yet become public knowledge. The Embassy is fairly certain that Cuba has offered scholarships for study in Cuba; and that Charles Semahuna, chief of the Burundi Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

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and Pascual Kaboneye, the deputy director of the National Police, went to Havana in late December to discuss and study Cuban governmental organization and its adaptability to Burundi. [REDACTED] the 25X1C□

discussions in Cuba will concentrate on a governmental reorganization plan to shore up President Michel Micombero's authority. Four Cubans, the first members of a small mission to train the Burundi militia and to teach counter-intelligence techniques to the police, reportedly have now arrived in Bujumbura.

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Cuban Subversive Activities in Ghana-Guinea

June 1967

1. Cuban personnel in Guinea may have been cooperating with President Sékou Touré in small-scale training of pro-Nkrumah Ghanaian exiles last year. Recent information indicates, however, that no such activity is now in progress.

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[REDACTED] 25 to 50 Cubans

[REDACTED] are training Portuguese Guineans in guerrilla warfare and subversion techniques near Boké, and this is probably the extent of Cuban subversive activity at the present time.

2. Ships arriving in Conakry have brought in supplies for the Cubans and have allegedly carried military hardware as well as medical technicians for the PAIGC camp hospital in Boke. A small number of Guineans are reportedly in Cuba for training.

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Cuban Subversive Activities in Mali

June 1967

At least 25 Cuban medical and non-military personnel are in Mali. This group is apparently replaced on a yearly basis.

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Cuban Subversive Activities in Algeria

June 1967

The fall of the Ben Bella regime in June 1965 was the biggest setback Cuba has suffered in Africa. Following the coup, Castro denounced President Boumedienne as a "reactionary and counterrevolutionary." Since then, however, relations between the two countries have thawed somewhat and the Cubans have been pressing to improve them further. At the present time, there are perhaps 60 - 70 members of a Cuban medical team in Algeria.

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Cuban Subversive Activities in Other African Countries

June 1967

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1.

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there is serious concern in Gabonese government circles regarding reports of four paramilitary training camps staffed by Cubans and Chinese in Congo (Brazzaville) about 100 kilometers south of the Gabon border toward Dolisie. Cubans are said to be reminding the Congolese to claim the Gabonese manganese mines located in the Franceville area of the Congo-Gabon border, in the event that domestic troubles in Gabon weaken that country's defenses.

2. A few dissidents from Nigeria and a few from Ethiopia have traveled to Cuba during the past two years.

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[REDACTED] small numbers of Nigerian Communists had received guerrilla warfare training in Cuba in 1965. There is no evidence that this training is still in progress. Recent information indicates that at least 20 members of the Ethiopian dissident group, the Eritrean Liberation Front, left for Cuba in January 1967 for guerrilla and academic training.

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Cuban Subversive Activities in Tanzania

June 1967

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1.

the Cubans are making efforts to gain influence in the Tanzania-based nationalist movement directed against the Portuguese overseas province of Mozambique. In early January 1966, the Cubans reportedly approached Uriah Simango, a leader of the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) with an offer of assistance. It is now believed that at least part of the cargo of the Cuban freighter MANUEL ASCUNCE which arrived in Dar-es-Salaam in late November is destined for the Mozambique rebels.

2. Havana also has been assisting the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) which is directed against Rhodesia. [REDACTED] the major

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portion of military hardware aboard the MANUEL ASCUNCE was intended for ZAPU contingents located in Tanzania. Reportedly, 67 ZAPU insurgents embarked on this ship for training in Cuba.

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3. Other sources have indicated that the Cuban freighter MAFFO which arrived in Dar-es-Salaam on 20 January 1967 may be carrying 106 Rhodesian nationals and 20 Zanzibaris to Cuba for military and agricultural training respectively. There are also reports of Cuban arms shipments for the Tanzanian army, an improved communications network between Havana and Dar-es-Salaam, agricultural equipment and scholarships for the Afro-Shirazi Party Youth group, and medical assistance to Zanzibar.

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Cuban Subversive Activities in Congo (Kinshasa) June 1967

1. Cuban involvement in Congo (Kinshasa) apparently began in 1961 with the training of Congolese dissidents. About 15 Congolese traveled to Cuba late that year or in early 1962, presumably for guerrilla warfare training or ideological indoctrination, or both. A diary and papers taken from the bodies of two Cubans killed in action in the Congo in 1965 referred to participation in ambushes and rebel attacks in the eastern Congo. Cuban involvement reached its zenith during the height of the 1964-65 rebellion.

2. Following a series of rebel defeats, Cuban military personnel were pulled out beginning in November 1965. Reportedly over 100 left Bar-es-Salam in late December 1965 and early January 1966. Since that time Cuba has offered to train some exiled Congolese rebels led by Gaston Soumialot. Thus far, however, Soumialot and his followers are shying away from armed action and appear to be concentrating on building a Congolese cadre in exile.

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3. Some of the subversives being trained by Cubans in Congo (Brazzaville) now are targeted against Congo (Kinshasa); they may have hopes of bringing down the Mobuto regime. According to unconfirmed reports, however, Mobuto has made overtures to some Cuban officials and an economic aid agreement may have been discussed in August 1966, during his visit to Brazzaville. On the other hand, other sources have commented that Mobuto was chagrined by the state of affairs in Brazzaville and vowed that he would not allow "anything like that" to happen in Kinshasa.

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Cuban Subversive Activities in Congo (Brazzaville) June 1967

1. Cuban military personnel have been in Congo (Brazzaville) for almost two years, giving paramilitary training to the National Civil Defense Corps (NCCD) and the youth wing of the ruling political party (JMKR). At the present time there are an estimated 600-700 Cubans engaged in this training and serving as advisers to the Congolese Air Force and Navy. Others are functioning as agricultural advisers, and 28 Cuban medical doctors have reportedly replaced a French team that left after last summer's abortive mutiny by part of the army.

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2. [REDACTED] most of the Cubans are located near Brazzaville, Linsolo, Dolisie, Pointe Noire, and at Djoue. Their subversive training activities are ultimately directed against Angola, including the exclave of Cabinda, Cameroon, and Congo (Kinshasa). Reportedly, Cubans are also maintaining two radio transmitters in the Congo in order to coordinate clandestine missions with agents in neighboring countries. They are

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allegedly commanded by Major Terry Thorndike, a negro of either North American or British Antilles origin. They are supplied by Cuban and possibly Soviet freighters which put in at Pointe Noire.

3. There is notable friction between the Cubans in Congo (Brazzaville) and various elements of the population. Since the Cubans saved the Massamba-Debat regime last summer, fights and other incidents have occurred in which several persons have reportedly been killed. A natural antagonism exists between the Cubans and the Congolese army, which is supposed to be replaced by a Cuban-trained peoples' militia and has already lost to the Cubans the function of protecting the president.

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
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GUATEMALA: Areas of Guerrilla Activity



13 Nov. 50/100 (Yon Sosa)
FAR 250/300 (Cesar Montes)

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
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VENEZUELA: Areas of Guerrilla Activity



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
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CUBA: SAM Sites and Major Military Airfields



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BOLIVIA: Area of Guerrilla Activity



COLOMBIA: Areas of Guerrilla Activity



ELN-200/220
FARC-250/300

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